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I. TRADITIONAL REJECTION OF AN "OUTLAW" DOCTRINE 
Not long ago, American tort law clearly rejected an "outlaw" doctrine: a plaintiff 
engaged in tortious or criminal acts was not treated as an outlaw who could be 
injured with impunity.' As this principle was expressed in the American Law 
Institute's Restatement (Second) a/Torts: "One is not barred from recovery for 
an interference with his legally protected interests merel~ because at the time of 
the interference he was committing a tort or a crime .... " 
This was true regardless of whether the plaintiff's claim was based on 
intent, recklessness, negligence, or strict liability.' The plaintiff's unlawful 
conduct might give rise to a defense such as contributory or comparative 
negligence under ordinary tort prlnciples,4 or might trigger a privilege assertable 
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I See Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 44 (N.Y. (984) (Jasen, J., concurring) (stating that the "so-
called 'outlaw' doctrine ofton laW-i.e., depriving a violator of the law of any rights against a ton· 
feasor-has long since been discarded by most, if not all, American jurisdictions .... " (Citations 
omitted». 
2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 889 (1979). Nevertheless, there is evidence that early 
American law did recognize some fonn of unlawful conduct defense. In Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 45, 
Judge Matthew Jasen wrote: 
[T]hese same principles of public policy were once elegantly expressed in another 
context by Justice Brandeis: ''The door of a coult is not barred because the plaintiff 
has committed a crime. The confirmed criminal is as much entitled to redress as his 
most virtuous fellow citizenj DO record of crime, however long, makes one an outlaw. 
The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in connection 
with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then aid is denied 
despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in 
order to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preselVe the 
judicial process from contamination." 
(Jasen, J., concurring) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting». 
3 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 889 cmts ... b (1979) (discussing intentional honn, 
recklessness, negligence, and liability for abnormally dangerous activities). The Restatement even 
rejected an outlaw doctrine between co-conspirators. ld. at § 889 cmt. c ("Although one is engaged 
in a criminal activity with another person, he is nevertheless entitled to recover for hann 
intentionally inflicted by his fellow conspirator, and this is troe even though the hann arises out of 
and because of the crime that is being commined.'1, 
4 ld. at § 889 cmt. b ("Criminal conduct that by vinne of statutory interpretation or otherwise 
constitutes negligence or recklessness, is a defense to an action for harm caused by corresponding 
,. .. .. 
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against the plaintiff, such as one ''to prevent crime or to arrest a criminal. "S 
However, unlawful conduct, by itself, did not inevitably bar the courthouse 
doors. 
Various cases allowed plaintiffs to sue for harm that they suffered while 
engaged in illegal gambling, fornication, doing unlicensed business, or while 
unlawfully present in the United States.6 Other suits permitted recovery by 
persons injured while trespassing on another's property/ or while traveling 
unlawfully on Sunday· or in an unregistered vehicle.9 Beyond American borders, 
other countries also eschewed an outlaw doctrine. 10 
The second Restatement's rejection of a rule making tortious or criminal 
conduct an absolute obstacle to recovery in tort was not surprising. The same 
position had been embraced four decades earlier by the ftrst Restatement,l1 and 
the most respected legal commentators had renounced the contrary view. In their 
classic treatise on the law of torts, Fowler V. Harper and Fleming James, Jr., 
wrote that treating the "violator of penal statutes ... as something of an outlaw .. 
. disentitled to seek redress through the courts for any injury to which his 
criminal conduct contributed ... [was] a barbarous relic of the worst there was in 
puritanism.,,12 The same reasoning was later endorsed by the eminent torts 
, ld. at § 889 cmt. •. 
6 See id. at § 889 Reporter's Note. 
7 In one famous case, Kalko v. Briney. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971), a trespasser injured by a 
concealed spring gun on the defendanCs property was allowed to recover compensation for harm 
intentionally inflicted via that mechanism. The court held that the plaintiff's deliberate violation of 
the law did not change the rule that deadly force cannot be used merely to protect propeny. Katlro 
was controversial, but the decision was not unique in the principles it applied. Katko outraged 
many persons not merely because a lawbreaker was pennitted to recover, but because the 
defendants had to sell a large part of their farm to pay the judgment. See Robert F. Bloomquist, Re-
Enchanting Torls, 56 S.C. L. REv. 481, 501 n.l49 (2005). 
8 See Carroll v. Staten Island R.R. Co .• 1874 WL 11265, "6 (N.Y. 1874) (uThe negligence of the 
defendant was as wrongful on Sunday as on any other day. and ... [the) plaintiff's unlawful act did 
not in any sense contribute to the explosion."). 
9 See Armstead v. Lounsberry, 151 N.W. 542, 544 (Minn. 1915)('The right ofa person to maintain 
an action for a wrong committed upon him is not taken away because he was at the time of the 
injury disobeying a statote law which in no way contributed to his injury."). 
10 See Ronen Peny, The Role 0/ Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive 
Theory, 73 TENN. L. REv. 177, 2 II n. 203 (2006) (discussing the UK and stating ·'the law does not 
allow even a criminal who has committed a serious offence to be deprived of all his or her rights 
under either the civil or criminal law. This would amount to outlawry, and this bas quite clearly, 
and in our view rightly, been rejected by the courts." (citing The Law Commission, Consultation 
PaperNo. 160: The Illegality Defence in Torts 77, 77-78 (2002»). 
11 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 889 (1939). 
12 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.6,995-97 (1956) (adding 
that the outlaw doctrine "could be justified at all only as a stringent means of imposing additional 
sanctions to enforce a very important provision of the criminal law, and [that] it is questionable 
indeed whether it is wise for the court to asswne the responsibility of imposing such a sanction 
when the legislature bas not seen fit to do so"). See also id. at 1005 (referring to the "outlaw 
theory"); Fleming James, Jr., Contributory Negligence. 62 YALE L.J. 691, 700 (I953)(describing 
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scholar Oscar S. Gray. 13 The co-authors of the Prosser treatise-perhaps the 
single most influential law book of the twentieth centuryl4--dismissed the outlaw 
theory as nonviable, stating that "the courts have long since discarded the 
doctrine that any violator of a statute is an outlaw with no rights against 
anyone. "IS 
Much has changed in American tort law during the past thirty years.'6 
including the rules relating to unlawful conduct. 17 Today, in an important range 
of cases, statutes and court decisions, in many states, now provide that injuries 
arising from the plaintiff's serious unlawful conduct are not compensable under 
tort law. IS For example, the New York Court of Appeals has ruled that: "[Wlhen 
the plaintiff haS engaged in activities prohibited, as opposed to merely regulated, 
by law, the courts will not entertain the suit if the plaintiff's conduct constituted a 
serious violation of the law and the injuries for which he seeks recovery were the 
direct result of that violation.,,19 
Legal malpractice law now recognizes an outlaw doctrine in a variety of 
guises. Most notably, in a majority of states, a convicted criminal cannot recover 
for legal malpractice related to his or her defense without obtaining reversal of 
the conviction or, in some jurisdictions, proving factual innocence of the 
offense.2o However, there are other legal rules which seize on the plaintiff's 
the "outlaw theory" as "largely disoredited" and "indeed a fairly accurate reflection of some such 
notion as an insistence on clean hands" which "shows its unacceptable harshness"), 
13 See FOWLER Y.lIARPER,FLEMINGJAMES,JR.,&OSCARS. GRAY, "fHELAWOFToRTS § 17.6,616-
18 (2d ed. 1986). 
14 See YINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STIIDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 6 (3d ed. 2005) 
(discussing the book's legendary status). See also Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th Edition) and the Prosser Legacy, 39 YAND. L. REv. 851, 852-53 
(1986) (discussing the Prosser legacy). 
IS W. PAGE KEETON, DAN D. DoBBS, ROBERTE. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON TORrs 232 (5th ed. 1984). 
" Cf JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 14, at 5 (discussing repeated efforts to refonn the law of torts 
in recent decades); Yincent R.lohnson, Tort Law in America at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 
I RENMIN U. L. REv. (China) 237, 24546 (2000) (hereinafter "Tort Law in America") (discussing 
efforts aimed at "turning back the clock" to "a time when American tort plaintiffs were often 
denied compensation for injuries and when tort law did little to create incentives for safety."). 
17 Compare Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 721 (Va. 1990) (barring the plaintiff from recovering 
damages for herpes contracted during participation in the crime of fornication with the defendant), 
with Long v. Adaros, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (contrary holding). 
18 See infra Part ll. But see Goldfuss v. Davidson, 679 N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (Ohio 1997) (per Moyer, 
C.J., with two judges concurring, and three judges concurring in judgment only) (holding, in an 
action based on the allegedly negligent shooting of a trespasser, that public policy does not 
preclude recovery for injuries sustained during the commission ofa felony). 
" Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 41 (holding that a fifteen-year-oJd boy who was injured while constructing 
a "pipe bomb" was precluded from recovering from the nine-year-old boy who supplied the 
gunpowder). But see Flanagan v. Baker, 621 N.E.2d 1190, 1192-93 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) 
(holding, on facts "almost identical" to those in Barker, that even if the Massachusetts comparative 
negligence statute allowed negligence actions by certain lawbreaker. to be barred for public policy 
reasons, the plaintiff child's action was not barred on thaI basis). 
2. See infra Part IlI.A. Of course, unlawful conduct can also create an obstacle to recovery in 
contract. A malpractice claim is often met with a counterclaim for unpaid fees that the plaintiff 
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unlawful conduct as an insuperable obstacle to recovery for legal malpractice. 
Rulings deny relief from errant attorneys under the rubric of in pari deliclo,21 
unclean hands,22 and even proximate causation.'3 Other cases,'· discussed 
below,'s have held that an "insider fraud" defense may preclude a legal 
malpractice action on behalf of a corporate entity?6 
There are questions as to how far the unlawful conduct defense extends. 
Suppose, for example, that a client is held civilly liable to investors for fraud, but 
never subject to criminal prosecution. Is a malpractice claim against the lawyer 
who provided legal representation related to those fraudulent activities barred by 
the fact that, at the time of the alleged malpractice, the client was engaged in 
serious unlawful conduct? On various rationales, a number of courts have 
answered that question in the affmnative on similar facts.27 In a typical passage, 
one court wrote: 
owes the defendant law finn. In one such case, the California Supreme Court held that a New York 
law finn's unauthorized practice of law in California barred enforcement of its fee agreement with 
respect to legal services performed in California. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, 
P.C. v. Super Ct. of Santa Clara County, 949 P.2d I (Cal. 1998). So too, in some states, a contract 
procured by improper client solicitation is unenforceable. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS 787 (1986); see also TEx. DISCIPLINARV R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.03(d) (2007) 
(providing that "a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge for, or collect a fee for 
professional employment obtained in violation" of the Texas anti-solicitation rules). 
21 See infra Part III.B. 
II See infra Part m.c. 
2J See infra Part III.E. 
24 See FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171·72 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing an insider fraud 
defense); Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, 268 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(holding that a trustee could not "sue third·party professionals [anorneys and accountants 1 for 
allegedly aiding and abetting corrupt management in a scheme to defraud the debtor corporation ... 
. "), 
" See infra Part III.D. 
26 See generally David B. Newdorf, Inside Fraud, Outside Negligence and the Savings and Loan 
Crisis.. When Does Management Wrongdoing Excuse ProfesSional Malpractice, 26 LoY. L.A. L. 
REv. 1165 (1993). 
27 See Shabbaz v. Horwilz, 2008 WL 808034, '9·'10 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2008) (holding that a 
client who fraudulently induced a third party to enter into an agreement could not establish 
proximate causation in a legal malpractice claim against a law firm that assisted the transaction 
because, as a matter of public policy, the client was precluded from shifting responsibility for his 
intentional wrongdoing to his attorneys, even if the attorneys drafted the agreement negligently); 
Mettes v. Quinn, 411 N.E.2d 549, 551 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980) (holding, in a suit where an attorney's 
allegedly negligent advice caused the plaintiff's fraud to be discovered, that no relief was available 
because the cowts ''will not aid a fraudfeasor"). See also In re Gosman, 382 B.R. 826, 837-38 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that a legal malpractice action was barred under the doctrine of in 
pari delicto where a client engaged in fraud, but the attorney was merely negligent); Heyman v. 
Gable, Gotwals, Mock, SchWabe, Kihle, Gaberino, 994 P.2d 92, 94 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) 
(bolding that where a final judgment established that a law firm's clients had committed fraud 
against their partners, no legal malpractice action could be maintained based on the finn's allegedly 
negligent drafting of an agreement between the clients and their partners or the finn's 
representation of the clients at trial; "[i]t would be contrary to public policy to allow the Clients 
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Having been held personally liable for fraud, [the client] is barred from suing 
his former attorney for damages based on either malpractice ... or breach of 
fiduciary duty ... in the advice that allegedly underlay [the client's] actions. 
Courts have held that those who knowingly have engaged in fraudulent 
behavior may not subsequently maintain suit against their (former) 
professional advisors. 28 
47 
Taking into account the various rationales for denying relief, it is plain that 
there is an unlawful conduct defense-or what some have called a ''wrongful-
conduct defense"" or "serious misconduct bar,030 -which sometimes precludes 
recovery in a legal malpractice action. However, the contours of that obstacle to 
suit are quite unclear?' 
Courts are in disagreement as to both the requirements of the unlawful 
conduct defense and whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden of 
proof. These are vital questions, for what is at stake is the closing of courthouse 
doors to clients who have allegedly been victimized by the misconduct of 
attorneys who were duty-bound to protect their interests through the exercise of 
care and loyalty. 
It makes a world of difference, both to the individual litigant and to the 
faimess of the justice system, whether unlawful conduct is treated as an 
affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof, as opposed 
to an aspect of proximate causation that precludes a plaintiff from establishing a 
prima facie case. So too, it is tremendously important to defme what types of 
criminal or tortious conduct trigger the defense, how closely that conduct must be 
related to the legal malpractice for which recovery is sought, and how 
convincingly the plaintiff's default must be established. It is one thing to bar a 
cause of action based on the plaintiff's prior criminal conviction established by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, another thing to rely on an earlier civil 
judgment established by a preponderance of the evidence, and something else to 
allow allegations of criminal or tortious conduct to be adjudicated for the first 
time as part of the plaintiff's legal malpractice case. 
here to benefit from their own confirmed fraud and recover a monetary judgment from the Finn to 
indemnify them for their fraud."). 
28 Maxwell v. Stein, 1993 W.L. 512907,'3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1993). Maxwell was found guilty of 
perpetrating fraud on investors in a civil action filed in federal court by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission. ld. at *1-·2. Maxwell pled guilty in New Jersey state court to one count of 
selling an =gistered security. /d. at *2. 
" See Gragg v. Auburn Counseling Assocs., Inc., 2002 WL 1375746, *2 (Mich. App. June 25, 
2002) ("The wrongful-conduct rule provides that a plaintiff cannot maintain an action if the cause 
of action is based, in whole or in part, on his own illegal conduct"). 
30 See Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort 
Law, 43 WM. & MAlty L. REv. lOll, 1016 (2002) (offering a comprehensive history, description, 
and critique of the doctrine). 
31 See Heyman v. Gable, Gotwals, Mock, Schwabe, IGble, Gaberino, 994 P.2d 92, 95 (Okl •. Civ. 
App. 1999) (Stubblefield, J., concurring in result) (noting, in a suit raising the question of whether 
clients' fraud against third persons barred a malpractice action against the clients' attorneys, that 
"there is linle discoverable authority purporting to determine such cases on the basis of public 
policy."). 
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Judicial recognition of a generally applicable unlawful conduct defense in 
legal malpractice law could have a tremendous impact on many disputes, 
including the viability of efforts by corporate clients and their successors, such as 
bankruptcy trustees,32 to recoup from law firms the costs of corporate 
wrongdoing.33 During the past two decades, that kind of claim has been a major 
theme in the lawsuits that followed tbe savings and loan crisis34 or the collapse of 
major businesses such as Enron.3S Today, such claims are increasing in 
number.36 
This article explores whether there is a sound legal basis for a general 
unlawful conduct defense in legal malpractice cases and whether recognition of 
sucb a defense would be a desirable development in this area of the law. Part II 
begins by examining the recent emergence of the unlawful conduct defense in 
areas of tort law not necessarily involving legal malpractice, including statutes 
passed in a number of jurisdictions, related decisions, and opinions recognizing 
the defense as a matter of common law. This broad perspective is useful because 
in many respects the law of lawyer liability is not an independent construct 
"See. e.g .. Douglas v. Delp. 987 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex. 1999) (holding that once a party with a 
legal malpractice claim declares bankruptcy, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate is the only party 
with standing to pursue the claim). See also Anthony Lin, News in Brief, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 17,2006, at 
I (reporting that Paul, Weiss, Ritkind. Wharton & Garrison "agreed to pay part ofa $180 million 
senlement of claims arising from the 1998 bankruptcy of Boston Chicken Inc." in a suit by the 
company's court-appointed bankruptcy trustee). 
" See also In re Gosman, 382 B.R at 838 (barring a legal malpractice suit by a trustee in 
bankruptcy based on the debtor's fraud). 
J4 See Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical 
Study, 58 Bus. LAw. 1387, 1394 (2003) (stating that "[t)he collapse of real estate and energy prices 
in the late 1980s resulted in massive failures of savings and loan associations. Federal agencies 
relentlessly anempted to hold law firms and accounting firms responsible for losses."); Susan Saab 
Fortney, Am I k(y Partner's Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U. CoLO. L. REv. 329, 331-32 
(1995) (indicating that "[i)n at least six ... actions brought in connection with failed savings and 
loan associations, the government ... alleged that each law firm partner [was) personally liable for 
failing to monitor the conduct of other firm partners."); Cory M. Martin, Pogo. &q. Views 
FIRREA: "We Have Met the Enemy and They are Us" (A Litany of Law Firm Defendants. Cases. 
and Selliemenls), 4 No. I LEGAL MALPRACTICE REP. 18, 18-20 (1993) (discussing lawsuits against 
lawyers caused by savings and loan institution failures); The Hall of Blame: Law Firms Cited In 
Liability Cases, 12 No.3 OF COUNSEL 9 (1993) (discussing "firms sued for representing Lincoln 
Savings and Loan Association"); Newdorf, supra note 26, at 1166 (discussing the ''unprecedented 
number of malpractice suits" seeking to hold attorneys and accountants liable for losses at corrupt 
savings and loan associations). 
" Cf GEOFFREV C. HAzARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES, & JOHN S. DZlENKOWSKl, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING § 4.8 (3d ed. 2006) (predicting malpractice lawsuits in the wake of Enron and other 
corporate scandals). 
" See Amanda Bronstad, Firms Fend Off More Malpractice Actions, NAT'L L.J. ONLINE, Mar. 31, 
2008 at I (reporting that "an increasing number of [malpractice) suits are being filed by the trustees 
overseeing the bankruptcy of a law firm's client."). 
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unrelated to basic tort rules, but an evolving set of standards animated to a great 
extent by the principles and policies that have evolved in other areas of tor! law.37 
Part III considers decisions holding that some types of unlawful conduct 
preclude a legal malpractice action. The discussion focuses, first, on the 
exoneration or innocence requirement that many states now impose on 
malpractice claims by criminal defendants; second, on the in pari delicto defense; 
third, on the unclean hands defense; fourth, on decisions, including some in the 
corporate context, indicating that fraud on the part of the plaintiff is a complete 
defense to a malpractice action; and fifth, on cases treating unlawful conduct as 
an aspect of proximate causation. 
Finally, Part IV addresses the appropriateness of an all-or-nothing unlawful 
conduct defense in the current age of comparatives principles. The discussion 
explores those considerations that should limit and shape future development of 
the unlawful conduct defense in the legal malpractice context. 
n. THE RISE OF THE UNLAWFUL CONDUCT DEFENSE IN 
AMERICAN TORT LAW 
A. Statutory Defenses 
A number of states have enacted statutes which foreclose lawsuits seeking 
damages for injuries reSUlting from serious unlawful conduct. These laws 
hearken back to harsh common law rules, which, at various times in Anglo-
American history, have denied legal protection to an "outlaw."" Some of the 
new laws are short and elegant. One California statute, enacted by a voter 
initiative,39 provides simply that, "In any action for damages based on 
negligence, a person may not recover any damages if the plaintiffs injuries were 
in any way proximately caused by the plaintiffs commission of any felony, or 
immediate flight therefrom, and the plaintiff has been duly convicted of that 
felony,',40 Similarly, an Ohio statute provides that: 
Recovery on a claim for relief in a tort action is barred to any person or the 
person's legal representative if the person has been convicted of or has 
pleaded guilty to a felony, or to a misdemeanor that is an offense of violence, 
37 See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (TinRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 53 (2000) (providing that 
whether a lawyer's breach ofa duty ofeare or breach ofa fiduciary duty was a legal cause of injury 
is "determined under generally applicable principles of causation aod damages"). 
)8 See King, supra note 30, at 1014-18 (tracing the history of denying legal protection to outlaws as 
far back as the twelfth centory). 
39 See Quackenbush v. Super. Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 273-74 (Cal Ct. App. 1997) (indicating 
that "[o]n November 5,1996, the voters approved Proposition 213, the Personal Responsibility Act 
of 1996, adding sections 3333.3 aod 3333.4 to the Civil Code, applicable to trials commencing after 
January I, 1997," and holding those provisions to be constitutional). Section 3333.4 is discussed 
below in note 69. 
40 CAL. CIY. Coos § 3333.3 (West 2008). 
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arising out of criminal conduct that was a Eroximate cause of the injury or 
loss for which relief is claimed in the action. I 
Other state laws are more detailed. For example, an Alaska statute 
addresses with great specificity the types of criminal activity that give rise to an 
unlawful conduct defense, the significance of pleas of guilty or nolo contendre, 
and how the rule operates in cases where there has been no prior conviction.42 
Statutes creating an unlawful conduct defense are animated by a common 
theme. They seek to punish persons who have engaged in serious wrongdoing by 
curtailing their rights to sue for damages and preventing them from shifting 
responsibility for their anti-social conduct.43 The text of the Proposition that led 
to the enactment of the California law quoted above44 included a blunt statement 
41 Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.60(B)(2) (west 2008). 
42 ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.210 (2008). Section 09.65.210 provides: 
A penon who suffers personal injury or death or the person's personal representative . 
. . may not recover damages for the personal injury or death if the injury or death 
occurred while the person was 
(I) engaged in the commission of a felony, the person has been convicted of the 
felony, including conviction based on a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, and the 
party defending against the claim proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
felony substantially contributed to the personal injury or death; 
(2) engaged in conduct that would constitute the commission of an unclassified 
felony, a class A felony, or a class B felony for which the person was not convicted 
and the party defending against the claim proves by clear and convincing evidence 
(A) the felonious conduct; and 
(B) that the felonious conduct substantially contributed to the personal iI\iury or 
death; 
(4) operating a vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor or any controlled substance in violation of AS 28.35.030, was 
convicted, including conviction based on a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, and 
the party defending against the claim proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
conduct substantially contributed to the personal injury or death; or 
(5) engaged in conduct that would constitute a violation of AS 28.35.030 for which 
the person was not coDvicted if the party defending against the claim proves by clear 
and convincing evidence 
(A) the violation of AS 28.35.030; and 
(B) that the conduct substantially contributed to the personal injury or death. 
43 Similar statements have been made by courts discussing common law versions of the unlawful 
conduct defense. See, e.g., Rimer! v. Mortell, 680 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating 
that the "prohibition against actions based in whole or in part upon one's own criminal conduct is 
grounded upon the sound public policy that convicted criminals should not be pennitted to impose 
or shift liability for the consequences of their own antisocial conduct"). See also Barker, 468 
N.E.2d at 43 (stating that the defense "rests ... upon the public policy consideration that the 
courts should not lend assistance to one who seeks compensation under the law for injuries 
resulting from his own acts when they involve a substantial violation of the law"). 
44 See supra text accompanying note 40. 
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of findings and purpose, which obviously the voters found appealing. That 
statement read: 
Insurance costs have skyrocketed for those Califomians who have taken 
responsibility for their actions. . .. [C]riminal felons are law breakers, and 
should not be rewarded for their irresponsibility .... However, under current 
laws, ... criminals have been able to recover damages from law-abiding 
citizens for injuries suffered during the commission of their crimes. . . . 
Californians must change the system that rewards individuals who fail to take 
essential personal responsibility to prevent them from seeking unreasonable 
damages or from suing law-abiding citizens." 
One might conclude that the Proposition was intended to protect only "Iaw-
abiding citizens," persons who were blameless, innocent of fault. However, a 
subsequent case addressing the quoted language made clear that the initiative had 
a broader reach: "[l]aw abiding cannot and does not mean free of all blame .... 
In expressly barring negligence claims, the initiative presupposes that the 
defendants, in fact, may have been negligent.'>46 
At least one state, more than a quarter century ago, passed legislation 
rejecting an outlaw doctrine with language paralleling the rule of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,47 quoted above in the text.4S That Massachusetts statute 
provides: 
The violation of a criminal statute, ordinance or regulation by a plaintiff 
which contributed to said injury, death or damage, shall be considered as 
evidence of negligence of that plaintiff, but the violation of said statute, 
ordinance or regulation shall not as a matter oflaw and for that reason alone, 
serve to bar a plaintiff from recovery." 
However, the recent trend is to the contrary. 
In general, state statutes that bar a civil action for damages based on the 
plaintiff's own unlawful conduct vary in five important respects. Those 
variations concern: (I) the nature of the unlawful conduct that triggers the rule; 
(2) the theories of recovery that are barred; (3) types of damages that may not be 
recovered; (4) how closely the unlawful conduct must be related to the injuries 
for which recovery is sought; and (5) whether there must have been a prior 
adjudication of criminal responsibility. 
" 1996 Cal. Legis. Servo Proposition 213 (West). 
46 Gage v. Network Appliance, inc., 2005 WL 3214954, *4,'4 (Cal. Cl App. 2005) (concluding 
that "nothing in the language of the initiative or the ballot materials reflects an intention on the part 
of the electorate to limit the tenD 'law-abiding citizens' to the victims of the plaintiff's crime."). 
" See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 889 (1979). 
48 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
"MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 2008) (enacted in 1973 as part oflbe comparative 
negligence law). 
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1. Nature of Unlawful Conduct 
Statutory versions of the unlawful conduct defense require proof of a 
serious criminal act. Typically, the act must be a felony/o or a particular type of 
felony.51 However, in some cases, certain misdemeanors, such as "operating a 
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or 
any controlled substance, .. 52 may suffice to foreclose relief in a civil cause of 
action. 
In the overall scheme of things, some crimes, though denominated felonies, 
are based on relatively minor conduct,5l such as theft of a small amount of 
money.54 So too, criminal laws have recently lowered the level of alcohol that 
constitutes legal intoxication. 55 It is reasonable to ask whether it is unnecessarily 
harsh56 for laws that treat all forms of felonious conduct, or all degrees of legal 
intoxication, as a total bar to compensation for injuries relating to another's 
tortious conduct. 
2. Theories of Recovery Barred 
One California statute establishing an unlawful conduct defense refers only 
to negligence claims arising from felonious conduct.57 Quite logically, that 
provision has been interpreted as not precluding intentional tort actions. 58 
However, another California law provides that in certain circumstances an owner 
so CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.3 (West 2008) ("any felony"). 
" ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.210 (2008) (providing that an action for damages is barred by conviction 
of any felony or by clear and convincing evidence of a class A or class B felony of which the 
plaintiff was not convicted). 
" ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.210 (2008). In Alaska, operating a vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any controlled substance is usually a class A 
misdemeaoor. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030 (b) & (n)(2008). 
" See Stephen Allen, Note, Mental Health Treatment and the Criminal JWltice System, 4 J. HEAL1H 
& BIOMEDICAL L. 153, 176 (2008) (referring to "minor felonies"); Irina Kashcheyeva, Comment, 
Reaching a Compromise: How 10 Save Michigan Ex-offenders from Unemployment and Michigan 
Employers from Negligent Hiring Liability, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1051, 1087 n. 190 (2007) 
(discussing a statute that allows for the sealing of records relating to minor felonies). 
54 Cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266 (1980) (discussing a felony conviction for obtaining 
$120.75 by false pretenses). 
" See John Hoffinao, Note, Implied Consent With a Twist: Adding Blood to New Jersey's Implied 
Consent Law and Criminalizing Refusal Where Drinking and Driving Results in Death or Serious 
Injury, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 345, 349-50 (2003) (reporting that most states have lowered their legal 
limit for intoxication to .08% blood alcohol content). 
'6 Cf Rummel, 445 U.s. at 288-89 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing history of the proportionality 
principle in Anglo-Americao criminal law and noting that "The Magna Carta of 1215 insured that 
'[a] free man shall not be [fined] for a trivial offence, except in accordance with the degree ofthe 
offence; and for a serious offence he shall be [fined] according to its gravity. "'). 
S1 See supra text accompanying note 40. 
"See Jenkins v. County of Los Angeles, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 153 (Cal. CI. App. 1999) (involving 
injuries arising from shots tired by a police officer). 
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of real property shall not be liable for injuries that occur upon the property during 
or after the injured person's commission of anyone of twenty-five specified 
felonies.59 That statute has been held to bar not only suits for negligent conduct, 
but also claims for intentionally injurious acts that were justifiable under the 
circumstances.60 
The Ohio statute quoted above in the text,61 which hroadly precludes "relief 
in a tort action,'.62 expressly states that it "does not apply to civil claims based 
upon alleged intentionally tortious conduct.,,63 However, beyond that limitation, 
it is possible that the Ohio statute does not preclude a legal malpractice action at 
all. The Ohio law expressly provides that: "[a] 'tort action' means a civil action 
for damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property other than a civil 
action for damages for a breach of contract or another agreement between 
persons.'''''' 
A legal malpractice action, even if based on tort theories rather than 
contract principles, might be treated as a "civil action for damages for a breach of 
. . . [an] agreement" between the lawyer and client, and therefore not the type of 
"tort action" that is barred by the statute.65 This question has not yet been 
decided by the Ohio courts, whose reported decisions seem to have seldom 
considered the state's statut07. bar in any context. Interestingly, an action 
against a lawyer by a nonclient, such as one for negligent misrepresentation67 or 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duties,68 might be treated differently 
than a claim by a client under the Ohio law. There is no "contract or another 
agreement" between a nonclient and lawyer, and therefore the nonclient's claim 
might qualify as a "tort action" that is barred by the plaintiff's felonious conduct. 
In that case, a question would arise as to why equally serious forms of unlawful 
conduct are sufficient to cut off a non-client's rights, but not the rights of a client. 
These issues, too, have not been resolved by the Ohio courts. 
" CAL. CIY. CODE § 847 (West 2008). 
60 See Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 69 (Cal. 1998) (interpreting CAL. CIY. CoDE § 
847). 
61 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.60 (B)(2) (West 2008). 
" Id. 
'3Id. at (B)(3) . 
.. Id. at (B)(I) (emphasis added). 
6$ Id. 
.. See generally SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. 10HNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: 
PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 134-36 (2008) (hereinafter LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW) (discussing a 
dozen theories under which attorneys may be liable to thin! persons). 
67 See REsTAlHdENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (sets forth the classic fonnulation of the 
tort). 
os See generally Katarina P. Lewinbuk, Let's Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against 
Lawyers for Aiding and Abel/ing a Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIz. ST. L.l. 135, 146 
(2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abel/ing Clients' Misconduct 
UnderState Law, 75 DEF. COUNs.l. 130 (2008). 
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3. Types of Damages Precluded 
Statutory unlawful conduct defenses sometimes specify what types of 
damages may not be recovered by a plaintiff, rather than what theories of liability 
(e.g., negligence) are foreclosed. 69 For example, an Alaska law provides that if 
the person has engaged in certain forms of criminal conduct (such as "a felony .. 
. [of which] the person has been convicted"7~, that person, or the person's 
personal representative, "may not recover damages for the [resulting) personal 
injury or death.,,7l Legal malpractice by a lawyer is seldom alleged to have 
caused the death of a client-although cases have raised that argument.72 The 
more relevant question, with respect to a provision such as the one found in the 
Alaska statute, is whether a claim for legal malpractice is an action seeking 
damages for "personal injury." That specific issue has not been addressed by 
Alaska courts. However, in other areas, the law sometimes treats legal 
malpractice as a "personal injury." That is why some courts hold that legal 
malpractice claims are not assignable73 or that prejudgment interest is available to 
a successful plaintiff.74 Yet, in other cases, the law has declined to characterize 
legal malpractice as a "claim for personal injury." Thus, some courts have held 
that a provision in a lawyer-client contract mandating arbitration of a legal 
69 For example. one California statute addressing auto accidents bars recovery of damages to 
compensate for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering or other nonpecuniary damages if 
the plaintiff was operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol or owned or operated 
the vehicle without proper insurance or proof of financial responsibility. See CAL. CIY. CoDE § 
3333.4 (West 2008). 
70 ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.210(1) (2008). 
11 ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.210 (2008). 
72 See, e.g., Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a widow's claim that 
bad tax advice had caused her husband to commit suicide); McPeake v. William T. Cannon, Esq., 
P.C., 553 A.2d 439 (pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (rejecting a claim arising from the death ofa client who 
committed suicide after being found guilty); McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123. 127 (N.H. 
1983) (holding that the connection between an attorney's alleged negligence and a client's suicide 
was too attenuated to impose legal Jiability on the attorney). 
In McPeake, an attorney was allegedly negligent in representing a criminal defense client 
on charges of burglary, rape, indecent assault, and corrupting the morals of. minor. When a guilty 
verdict was returned at the trial, the elientjumped from the fifth floor of the courthouse. The court 
refused to hold the attorney liable for the death for policy reasons, including the fact that imposing 
a risk of liability on these types of facts would discourage attorneys from representing "a sizeable 
number of depressed or unstable criminal defendants," and would therefore defeat the important 
goal of making legal counsel available to those who need it. 553 A.2d at 443. Presumably the 
same result could have been reached under a statutory or common law unlawful conduct defense 
because the client's proven felonious conduct was directly related to his death. 
13 See Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67 P.3d 1068, 1078 (Wash. 2003) (en bane) (holding that a 
motorist's legal malpractice claim against a law firm that represented him in • personal injury 
action was not assignable). 
74 See Sample v. Freeman, 873 S.W.2d 470, 476 (Tex. App.1 994) (holding that a legal malpractice 
action is a suit for personal injury and therefore prejudgment interest is available). 
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malpractice claim is not governed by provisions in the state arbitration act?' It is 
not possible to generalize about whether a legal malpractice action seeking 
damages is, or is not, a claim for personal injury for purposes of a statutory 
unlawful conduct defense. The answer inevitably depends on such matters as the 
relevant statutory language, legislative history, and case precedent. Nevertheless, 
it is important to recognize that the applicability of a statutory unlawful conduct 
defense to a legal malpractice action may tum upon the resolution of this type of 
question. 
4, Nexus Between the Unlawful Conduct and Injuries 
Statutes barring a plaintiff's action based on unlawful conduct do so only if 
that conduct is sufficiently linked to the damages the plaintiff seeks to recover. 
Yet, how strong that link must be varies with the language of the statute. Some 
statutes say that the plaintiff's injuries must have been "proximately cause[d1"76 
or "in any way proximately caused"77 by the criminal conduct of the plaintiff. 
Other statutes use language which might be found to be less demanding, 
requiring simply that the plaintiff's conduct must have "substantially 
contributed" to the injuries for which recovery is sought. 78 As anr law student 
knows, the principles of proximate causation cover broad territory.7 However, a 
nexus requirement framed in terms of whether the plaintiff's conduct 
"substantially contributed" to the plaintiff's harm might deny judicial relief in an 
even wider range of cases.80 To the extent that the unlawful conduct defense 
"See. e.g., Taylor v. Wilson, 180 S.W.3d 627, 630·31 (Tex. App. 2005). 
76 QIUO REv. CODEMN. § 2307.60(B)(2)(b)(West 2008). 
77 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.3 (West 2008) (emphasis added). 
78 ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.210(1) (2008). 
79 See generally LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW, supra Dote 66, at 94-95. The text states: 
In the proximate-causation context, courts frame the issue in a variety of ways. Some 
courts say that it is unfair to hold the defendant responsible and find that there is no 
proximate causation if the harm was unforeseeable. Others ask whether the result was 
''within the risk" created by the defendant, that is, whether the harm that occurred was 
one of the dangers that made the defendant's conduct negligent. ... If not, the 
defendant's conduct will not be found to be a proximate cause, and liability will not 
be assessed. Other courts ask whether the plaintiff's harm flowed from the 
defendant's negligence in a natural, continuous and unbroken sequence, ... or 
whether the result was "nonnal" (not in the sense of being "usual," but in the sense of 
not being "bizarre',. If so, it may be fair to impose liability, and the defendant's 
conduct may be found to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Many courts 
employ more than one of these modes of talking about proximate causation. selecting 
on a given occasion the language that seems most appropriate and useful. 
[d. at 94-95. See also VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MAsTERINO TORTS: A STUDENTS GUIDE TO TIlE LAW OF 
TORTS 14243 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the loose requirements of proximate causation); JOSEPH A. 
PAOE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSATION 19-27 (2003) (discussing competing approaches to the issue 
ofproxirnate causation, including hindsight tests, risk-foreseeability tests, and the duty-risk test). 
80 Cf Estate of Re v. Kornstein, Veis. & Wexler, 958 F. Supp. 907, 924-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(holding that a breach of fiduciary duty claim that was subject to a "substantial factor" standard for 
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forecloses all civil redress, it is reasonable to ask whether "proximate causation" 
or "substantial contribution" are sufficiently demanding standards for 
ascertaining whether the plaintiff's unlawful conduct and injuries are so closely 
related that recovery should be denied. 
Interestingly, court decisions embracing an unlawful conduct defense as a 
matter of common law'll sometimes impose what seems to be a more demanding 
causation requirement than found in many statutes. According to the New York 
Court of Appeals, "a serious violation of the law" bars recovery only for those 
injuries which are "the direct result" of that violation.82 Although what "direct,,83 
means has not been definitively charted by New York courts, the language 
suggests a connection closer than mere proximate causation is required.84 
5. Proof ofthe Plaintiff's Responsibility 
Some statutes creating an unlawful conduct defense only bar a civil action 
for damages if the injured party was previously found guilty of a criminal 
offense.8s This obviously poses difficulties to an assertion of the defense in a 
proving causation was more readily actionable against a law firm than a malpractice claim that was 
subject to the usual principles of proximate causation). 
8i See generally infra Part II.B. 
" See Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 41 (emphasis added). Addressing this requirement, the court cited 
Reno v. D'Javid, 369 N.E.2d 766 (N.Y. 1977), and explained: 
In the Reno case a woman who submitted to an illegal abortion could not recover 
for alleged negligence on the part of !he physician performing !he operation, ... 
[However, !he) rule denying compensation to !he serious offender would not apply 
in every instance where the plaintiff'S injury OCCWll while he is engaged in illegal 
activity. . .. Thus if !he plaintiff in the example cited above had been injured in an 
automobile accident as a result of another's negligence, she would not be denied 
access to the courts merely because she was on the way to have the illegal operation 
performed. 
83 The legendary Prosser hornbook talked about direct causation, as opposed to forseeability, as a 
test for proximate causation. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN D. DOBBS. ROBERTE. KEETON, & DAVID 
O. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 293-93 (5!h ed. 1984). According to !he hornbook, 
'''[d)irect' consequences are !hose which follow in sequence from !he effect of the . , . [person's) 
act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time, without the intervention of 
any external forces which come into active operation later." [d. at 294. The hornbook notes that 
the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" causes is "obviously an arbitrary one." Id. 
Nevertheless, the direct causation view of proximate causation is today reflected in the law of many 
judicial decisions. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Rotman, 297 F.3d 569, 573 (7!h Cir. 2002) (stating !hat 
"[a] proximate cause is one that produces an injury through a natural and continuous sequence of 
events unbroken by any effective intervening cause") . 
.. See Alami v. Volkswagen of America. Joc., 766 N.E.2d 574, 577 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that !he 
New York common-law unlawful conduct defense does not extend "beyond claims where !he 
parties to !he suit were involved in !he underlying criminal conduct, or where !he eriminal plaintiff 
seeks to impose a duty arising out of an illegal ac!," and therefore a defective desigo claim against a 
car manufacturer was not barred by !he intoxicated condition of !he motorist who died in the clllSh 
ofa vehicle). 
"See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3333.3 (West 2008). 
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wrongful death or survival action arising from fatal injuries which caused death 
too soon for prosecution to be commenced and completed.86 
Other statutes allow the injured person's criminal responsibility for a crime 
of which the person was not convicted to be established in the civil action itself.87 
To the extent that the standard of proof applicable in the civil suit is less 
demanding than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applicable in a 
criminal prosecution, there is less certainty that the plaintiff in fact engaged in 
unlawful conduct inimical to the interests of society. Yet this has not troubled 
some legislatures. Alaska, for example, applies a "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard.88 Nor has certainty "beyond a reasonable doubt" been a 
serious concern to certain courts that have recognized the unlawful conduct 
defense as a matter of common law. 89 In one New York case, where a child 
sought recovery for personal injuries arising from the construction of a pipe 
bomb, the court held that the action was barred by the unlawful conduct defense 
notwithstanding the fact that the child had not been convicted of the crime and, 
indeed, because of his age, could "not be held criminally responsible for his 
conduct.,,90 The court took what some would regard as a pragmatic view. 
Finding that the child, fifteen years of age, had "never claimed that he was 
ignorant of the fact that his conduct was wrongful,,,91 the court concluded that 
"the fact remains that constructing a bomb is prohibited by law. ,,92 
6. Application to Malpractice Actions 
A search of reported cases indicates that statutes barring actions for 
damages based on criminal conduct have seldom been invoked in legal 
malpractice cases.93 Yet, the text of some laws is broad enough to permit the 
argument that a legal malpractice action may not be maintained by a plaintiff 
who engaged in serious criminal conduct. In a legal malpractice action against a 
public defender, the California Supreme Court held that the client had to prove 
innocence of the charge on which he was convicted.94 The court supported its 
.. See HOlWich v. Super. Coun, 980 P.2d 927, 938 (Cal. 1999) (noling thaI conviclion of the 
decedent is "an unlikelY event if the felon or drunk driver dies in Ute incident"). 
87 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.210(2), (3), & (5) (2008). 
"Seeid. 
89 See infra Part II.B. 
90 Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 42. 
9' Id. a143. 
92 Id at 42. 
93 A number of the cases holding thaI a claim was barred by a statulory unlawful conducl defense 
have involved the use of force by police officers. See Sun v. State, 830 P.2d 772, 777-78 (Alaska 
1992) (holding thaI an excessive force claim was barred because the plaintiff's criminal conduct 
"substantially contributed 10 his injuries"); Allensworth v. City of Los Angeles, 2002 WL 321887, 
·6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002.) (holding that defendant's claims were precluded by defendant's criminal 
conviction); Maxie v. Preijers, 201 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 1999) (affmning dismissal of a negligence 
claim). 
94 See generally infra Part I1I.A. 
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opinion with a "ct:" citation to California Civil Code § 3333.3, quoted above in 
the text,9' which holds that a negligence action may not be maintained for 
injuries caused by a felony of which the plaintiff was convicted.96 The 
suggestion implicit in the citation is that such laws are not irrelevant to issues of 
attorney liability. 
At least one California case has considered whether felonious conduct bars 
an action for medical malpractice.97 In that suit, the plaintiff, Nakauchi, who was 
convicted of assault and false imprisonment, sued his psychiatrist alleging that 
improper medication had caused him to commit the crimes which led to his 
liability for a civil judgment to his victim, Quan, and to his own damages in the 
form of lost earnings and diminished earning capacity as a result of his 
incarceration.98 The intermediate court concluded that a "[l]iteral application of 
the broad language" of California Civil Code § 3333.3 ''would appear to 
preclude" the plaintiff's tort action against the psychiatrist "since the injury for 
which he now seeks damages ... (the Quan civil judgment and Nakauchi's own 
loss of earnings and earning capacity) was substantially caused by Nakauchi's 
commission of his felony assault on Quan. ,,99 However, the court concluded that: 
[Tlhe ballot materials circulated with Proposition 213 make it clear 
section 3333.3 is limited to circumstances in which a convicted felon 
accidentally suffers a personal injury while actually committing a crime 
or fleeing from the crime scene (for example, a burglar slips and falls 
on a slippery floor while robbing a convenience store).'oo 
Other courts might reach a different conclusion in deciding whether statements in 
ballot materials trump the express language of a ballot initiative. 101 Moreover, 
some statutory uu1awful conduct defenses may arise from contexts that support a 
broad application of the rule as precluding a legal malpractice suit for damages. 
B. Common Law Defenses 
1. Generally 
Even in the absence of a statute specifying that serious criminal conduct 
forecloses a civil action for damages, courts have denied redress as a matter of 
., See supra text accompanying note 40 . 
.. See Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 987·88 (Cal. 1998). 
" See Nakauchi v. Vollero, 2005 WL 3360902 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
98 See id. at '7. 
"ld. at'7 n.\3. 
100 ld. at'7 n. 13. 
101 See generally Hondo Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rplr. 2d 855, 857-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), 
review granted and opinion superseded by Hondo Co. v. Super. Court, 970 P.2d 408 (Cal. 1999) 
(discussing in detail the proper interpretation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3333.3 and 3333.4). 
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common law to persons whose claims were based on their own illegal acts. 102 
According to one court: 
This rule promotes the desirable public policy objective of preventing those 
who knowingly and intentionally engage in an illegal or immoral act 
involving moral turpitude from imposing liability on others for the 
consequences of their own behavior. Even so, such a rule derives principally 
not from consideration for the defendant, ''but from a desire to see that those 
who transgress the moral or criminal code shall not receive aid from the 
judicial branch of govemment."IO' 
As explained by another court, if a common law unlawful conduct defense 
were not recognized by the judiciary, several unacceptable consequences would 
result: 
First, by making relief potentially available for wrongdoers, courts in effect 
would condone and encourage illegal conduct .... Second, some wrongdoers 
would be able to receive a profit or compensation as a result of their illegal 
acts. Third, ... the public would view the legal system as a mockery of 
justice. Fourth,... wrongdoers would be able to shift much of the 
responsibility for their illegal acts to other parties. 104 
An unlawful conduct defense has been applied as a matter of common law 
in a wide range of cases. lOS Decisions have held, for example, that a suspect shot 
during a robbery could not sue the police for failing to arrest him prior to the 
robbery; 106 that the owner and manufacturer of a vending machine were not liable 
102 See Fuentes v. Alecio, 2006 WL 3813780, ·3 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (bolding that a wrongful death 
claim relating to a person who perished while trying to enter the United States illegally was barred). 
See also Chapman v. Super. Court, 29 Cal. Rplr. 3d 852, 862-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (bolding that 
public policy barred a former public official, who pleaded guilty to willful commission of a crime, 
from maintaining a legal malpractice action against an attorney based on the attorney's aUeged 
misinterpretation ofa statute); Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, 880 S.W.2d 466, 467 
(Tex. App. 1994) (holding that public policy precluded judicial consideration of a legal malpractice 
suit for damages by clients who were convicted of knowingly committing bank fraud after they had 
allegedly received negligent advice relating to a bank loan transaction). 
103 Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So. 2d 953, 954-55 (Ala. 1993) (quoting 
Bonnier v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., I J3 N.E.2d 615, 622 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 119 
N.E.2d 254 (1954), which held that a blacksmith's unlawful act of going onto a gondola car and 
taking therefrom a piece of scrap metal belonging to a third person was sufficient to defeat his 
action for injuries sustained when he was thrown from the top of the gondola car). 
104 Orzel by Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d208, 213 (Mich. 1995). 
10, See generally Laura Hunter Dietz, Actions Based upon Plaintiff's Wrongful, Illegal. or Immoral 
Acts or Conduct, AM. JUR. 20 ACTIONS § 39 (2008). 
106 See Amato v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 863, 867 (D.N.J. 1982) (opining that "[p]laintiff, in 
effect, states to the FBI that you should have stopped me, and because you did no~ I was injured 
and you are responsible. If the contention were carried to its logical extreme, the government 
would be liable to • burglar who fell off a ledder during the course of a burglary, if the police had 
the basis to arrest him earlier and did not."), affdwilhoUI opinion, 729 F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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to the estate of a minor who was killed when the machine fell on him during his 
attempt to steal drinks; 107 and that a guide who was convicted of transporting 
hunters without a license could not sue the state for damages in the form of lost 
business that were allegedly attributable to the state's negligence in responding to 
the guide's request for a license. lOB Likewise, courts have held that the 
perpetrator of manslaughter had no claim against the manufacturer and seller of 
the shotfolfl for direct personal losses alleged to have resulted from the 
shooting, 09 nor a customer against a bar that had served him liquor in violation 
of a dram shop law, 110 nor a passenger against a driver for injuries resulting from 
the operation of a stolen vehicle. III 
Like statutory versions of the unlawful conduct outlaw doctrine, which 
often require proof of a felony, some common law versions of the defense also 
require clear proof of criminal conduct.1I2 However, other common law 
formulations of the defense are broadly wordedll3 and may encompass conduct 
that does not amount to a felony or even a serious misdemeanor. For example, as 
stated by the Supreme Court oflowa, the general rule is that: 
107 See Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So.2d 953, 954-55 (Ala. 1993) 
(inteIpreting Hinkle v. RBilway Express Agency, 6 So. 2d 417 (1942), which stated that "[a] person 
cannot maintain a cause of action if, in order to establish i~ he must rely in whole or part on an 
illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party," as barring "any action seeking damages 
based On injuries that were a direct result of the injured party's knowing and intentional 
participation in a crime involving moral turpitude."). 
108 See Beilgard v. State, 896 P.2d 230, 233-34 n.6 (Alaska 1995) (finding that while a statutory 
unlawful conduct defense did not apply to the plaintiff because he was not convicted of a felony, 
public policy considerations precluded his claim for relief). 
109 See Adkinson v. Rossi Anus Co., 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983). 
110 See Lord v. Fogcutter Bar, 813 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1991); see also Vandenburg v. Brosnan, 514 
N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 1987), ajJ'd, 524 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that a passenger 
who procured beer for a minor driver had no cause of action against the seller). 
III See Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 1998) (finding that a minor who was 
injured in an accident involving a stolen vehicle was barred from recovery against the driver). 
112 See Rimert v. Mortell, 680 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that many jurisdictions 
have barred "actions seeking damages which were a direct result of the injured party's knowing and 
intentional participation in a criminal act"); Barker, 468 N.E.2d at 41 (stating that ''when the 
plaintiff's injury is a direct result of his knowing and intentional participation in a criminal act he 
cannot seek compensation for the loss, if the criminal act is judged to be so serious an offense as to 
warrant denial of recovery"). See a/so Craft v. Mid Island Dep't. Stores Inc., 492 N.Y.S.2d 780, 
782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that the conduct ofa minor in pouring pools of gasoline and 
lighting them with matches not such 8 serious violation of the law, or so criminal in nature, as to 
preclude recovery from the marketers of an allegedly flammable sweatshirt; "none of the 
defendants point to any penal statute applicable to the use of gasoline."). 
113 See, e.g., Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, 880 S.W.2d 466,469 (Tex. App. 1994) 
(stating that ''no action will lie to recover a claim for damages, if to establish it the plaintiffrequires 
aid from an iIlegaJ transaction, or is under the necessity of showing or in any manner depending 
upon an illegal act to which he is a party.") (quoting Gulf v. Johnson, 9 S.W. 602, 603 (Tex. 
1888». 
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a person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his cause of action, 
he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to 
which he is a party, or to maintain a claim for damages based on his own 
wrong or caused by his own neglect, ... or where he must base his cause of 
action, in whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal or penal 
laws .... "4 
61 
Moreover, while many statutes bar a civil action for damages only where 
the defendant has been previously convicted of a specified criminal offense, 
cases have held that a common law defense predicated on unlawful conduct bars 
tort claims even in the absence of prior prosecution and conviction. Thus, the 
rule has been found applicable where unlawful conduct resulted in the death of 
the lawbreaker. lIS Broad application of the conunon law defense based on 
unlawful conduct has even been held to bar claims by persons who did not 
engage in unlawful conduct, such as a surviving spouse's claim for loss of 
consortium."6 
A Michigan court endeavored to offer a detailed outline for the conunon 
law defense: 
[Wlhen a plaintiff's action is based on his own illegal conduct, the claim is 
generally barred .... This ma"im, known as the wrongful·conduct rule, has 
its e"ceptions. The mere fact that a plaintiff engaged in illegal conduct at the 
time of his injury does not mean that his claim is automatically barred .... 
To fan under the bar of the rule, the plaintiff's conduct must be prohibited or 
almost entirely prohibited under a penal or criminal statute. . .. There must 
also be a sufficient causal ne"us between the plaintiff's illegal conduct and 
the plaintiff's asserted damages . . . . Another possible e"ception to the 
wrongful conduct rule is where both the plaintiff and the defendant have 
engaged in illegal conduct, but the defendant's culpability for the damages is 
greater than the plaintiff's culpability .... This may occur, for example, 
where the plaintiff bas acted "under circumstances of oppression, imposition, 
hardship, undue influence, or great inequality of condition or age." . . . 
Finally, a plaintiff's claim is not barred by his wrongful conduct if a statute 
violated by the defendant e"p.licitly authorizes recovery by a person similarly 
situated as the plaintiff ... .' 7 
114 Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981)(quoting I C.J.S. Actions § \3 pp. 996·97). 
lIS See Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 621 So. 2d 953, 954 (Ala. 1993) (finding 
that because the parties did not dispute the fact that the decedent was stealing drinks from the 
vending machine when it fen on him, judgment for the defendants was proper); La Page v. Smith, 
563 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that an estate was barred from recovery for the 
death of an intoxicated driver during a high·speed race). 
116 See Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 768 (holding that a husband's loss of consortium claim should "be 
barred on the same public policy grounds" because such a claim "would also arise from a criminal 
act" and "the policies should not allow indirectly for the husband what they disallowed directly for 
the wife"). 
111 Poch v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Mich. O. App. 1998). 
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As the quotation suggests, common law versions of an unlawful conduct 
defense are not necessarily simple. In one recent case, the Fifth Circuit reversed 
a judgment for the defendants, finding that, under Texas law, "there are mUltiple 
versions of the unlawful acts rule; versions which emphasize different links 
between a plaintiff's illegal acts and injuries suffered ... [and that] the contours 
of the unlawful acts rule are simply too unclear to say that because of this rule, 
Plaintiffs have no possibility of recovery .... ,,'18 
As with statutory unlawful conduct defenses, the plaintiff's bad conduct 
must be sufficiently closely linked to the damages for which recovery is sought 
to make it fair to bar recovery. Where that nexus is lacking, the defense will be 
rejected by the court. I I 9 
2. Application to Malpractice Actions 
A number of decisions in the medical malpractice field have applied a 
common law unlawful conduct defense to bar civil actions for damages. Thus, 
courts have held that allegedly negligent psychologists,120 psychiatrists/21 
pharmacists,122 physicians, J23 and other mental health care professionalsl24 or 
'18 Rico v. Flores, 481 F.3d 234, 243-44 (5th Cir. 2007) (involving claims related 10 the deaths of 
ten illegal aHens who stowed away in a grain hopper railroad cat in an attempt to pass undetected 
through the Border Patrol checkpoint). 
'" See, e.g., Lindley v. Hackard & Holt, No. 3:05.CV·1476-L, 2007 WL 1119287, °7 (N.D. Tex. 
April 13, 2007) (finding the defense inapplicable because the defendant failed to show that the 
illegal acts caused or contributed to damages relating to fees owed under an unrelated, legitimate 
contract for legal referrals). 
12' Glazier v. Lee, 429 N.W.2d 857, 858·60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (in holding that a psychologist 
should not be liable for the emotional and psychological il\iuries resulting to a patient who killed 
his girlfriend, the court recognized the "legal principle that a court will not aid one who founds his 
cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act" and opined that "[t]o allow plaintiff to proceed in 
the present civil action would allow plaintiff to shift the responsibility for his crime from himself to 
defendant"). 
12' See Burcina v. City of Ketchikan, 902 P.2d 817 (Alaska 1995) (bolding that, as a maner of 
public policy, a patient who set fire to a mental health center and was convicted of arson could not 
assert a cause of action against his psychiatrist Or the facility at which he received treatment); Cole, 
301 N.W.2d at 768 (barring the plaintiff from suing ber psychiatrist for negligently fuiling to 
prevent her from committing 8 murder). 
122 Orzel by Orzel v. Scon Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208,210 (Mich. 1995) (holding that an action by 
a drug user and his relatives against a pharmacy for negligently and illegally filling pnrportedly 
valid prescriptions was barred by the drug user's own illegal conduct). 
,23 Ward v. Emmen, 37 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that negligence and other 
claims against a therapist aod physician were barred by the unlawful act rule because the claims 
were for dsmages that arose from the murder sbe committed; the plaintiff's illegal conduct was 
"not merely incidental to her claims," but "inextricably intertwined with those claims"). But see 
Boruschewitz v. Kirts, 554 N.E.2d 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (bolding that where an outpatient, who 
sbot and killed two persons, was found guilty but mentally ill, ao action against a pbysician and 
mental health center was not necessarily barred by the outpatient's violation of criminal laws or 
immoral acts, and remanding the case for further proceedings). 
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their employersl25 were not liable for damages suffered by patients as a result of 
crimes committed by those patients.126 Notably, several of these cases have 
expressly rejected arguments that a defendant should not be permitted to assert 
the unlawful conduct defense if the defendant took charge of the plaintiff with 
knowledge of the plaintiffs dangerous tendencies. I27 
Actions for medical malpractice and legal malpractice are in many respects 
governed by similar principles. 128 Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
common law unlawful conduct defense that has been applied to bar medical 
malpractice claims might also~ on appropriate facts, preclude an award of relief to 
a legal malpractice plaintiff.12 
Some cases have held that a common law unlawful conduct defense will 
defeat a claim against an attorney. In one recent suit, the court ruled that an 
individual had no legal right to remove documents that employees of third parties 
had placed in a trash dumpster on private property. Therefore, the unlawful acts 
rule precluded the individual from bringing an action for fraud against the third 
parties' attorney, based on allegations that the attornelo had defrauded the 
individual into turning the documents over to the attorney. I 0 
III. DEFENSES TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE BASED ON UNLAWFUL 
CONDUCT 
A. The Exuneratiun/InolK:eoce Requirement 
In the legal malpractice field, the unlawful conduct defense finds its clearest 
endorsement in the decisions that have required persons alleging defective 
124 But see Gragg v. Auburn Counseling Assocs., Inc., 2002 WL 1375746, at '2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2002) (finding that the ''wrongful conduct rule" did not bar the plaintiff's medical malpractice 
claim because "he would not have to prove that, .. [the plaintiff's decedent] was driving on a 
suspended license at the time oftbe car accident or that she was charged with negligent homicide to 
prevail on his Claim''). 
125 See Preston v. State, 543 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (a claimant convicted of 
assault was barred from suing the State for alleged medical malpractice resulting from not 
confining him prior to the incident). 
116 See also Rimert v. Mortell, 680 N.E.2d 867, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the unlawful 
conduct defense barred a claim for payment from a Patient's Compensation Fund). 
127 See, e.g., Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 767 (noting that the plaintiff had (unsuccessfully) cited Prosser's 
Handbook on the Law of Tons on the subject of the duty to control others). 
128 For example, the infonned consent principle that is well established in medical malpractice law 
also finds application in legal malpractice cases, See Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn, 
Misrepresentation by Lawyers About Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 529, 568-76 
(2004) (discussing infonned consent in law and medicine); Vincent R. Johnson, "Absolute and 
Perfect Candor" to Clients, 34 ST. MARY's L.J. 737, 749-50 (2003) [hereinafter "'Absolute and 
Perfect' Candor"] (similar). 
'" Cf Tracy Bateman Farrell and Elizabeth Williams, Effect of Client's Illegal Acts, 7 TEx. lUR. 3D 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 325 (2008) (stating that "!a] plaintiff's illegal acts committed knowingly and 
willfully cannot be a basis for recovery of damages in a legal malpractice action"). 
130 Sharpe v. Turley, 191 S.W.3d 362, 369 (Tex. App. 2006). 
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criminal representation to first overturn their convictions131 and, in some states, 
prove their innocence of the crimes for which they were prosecuted.132 Although 
these cases do not use the term ''unlawful conduct defense," they clearly seize 
upon the defendant's unlawful conduct to insulate attorneys from liability. 
What is most striking about state exoneration or innocence requirements is 
how broadly they sweep. Any kind of criminal conduct (misdemeanors as well 
as felonies), however established (whether by plea or conviction), wholly bars an 
action for professional negligence (regardless of the gravity of the attorney's 
misconduct).133 This is a broad formulation of what, for legal malpractice 
purposes, amounts to an "outlaw" doctrine. 134 It is easy to doubt the wisdom of 
these formidable obstacles to recovery for attorney wrongdoing. Not 
surprisin§l¥, exoneration or innocence requirements have been widely 
criticized 3 and their supposed rationales have sometimes been shown as 
wanting.136 
131 See generally Canaan v. Bartee, 72 P.3d 911, 913 (Kan. 2003) (joining the "large majority of 
courts" that hold that "a person convicted in a criminal action must obtain postconviction relief 
before maintaining an action alleging malpractice against his fonner criminal defense attorneys," 
evaluating the policy justifications for the rule, and oiling authorities); REsTATEMENT (TiIIRD) OF 
THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. d (2000) (rejecting an innocence requiremen~ but stating 
that "3 convicted defendant seeking damages for malpractice causing a conviction must have had 
that conviction set aside when process for that relief . .. is available. n). 
Il2 See. e.g., Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 P.3d 670, 672 (Cal. 2001) (stating that "(i]n a legal 
malpractice case arising out of a criminal proceeding," California, like most jurisdictions, also 
requires proof of actual innocence). 
J3J CI Amy L. Leisinger, Commen~ A Criminal DeJendant·. Inability to Sue His Lawyer Jar 
Malpractice: The Other Side oj the Exoneration Rule [Canaan v. Bartee, 72 P.3d 9 JJ (Kan. 
2003)), 44 W ASHBUlU"I L.l. 693, 727 (2005) (stating that "criminal defendants are left without 
redress for even the most egregious lega1 malpractice, while the rule insulates defense attorneys 
from full aceountability for their negligent representation.") . 
• 14 See supra Part I . 
• lS See Meredith 1. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability oJCrlminal DeJense Allomeys: A System in 
Need oj ReJorm, 2002 BYU L. REv. I, 46-47 (2002) (opining that "(t]be actual innocence rule 
makes the tort system available only to the innocent However, both the innocent and the guilty 
accused of a criminal offense are entitled to non-negligent legal representation . . .. Pennitting 
only actually innocent criminal defendants to avail themselves of the tort system exposes all 
criminal defendants-whether innocent or not-to representation by lawyers who bave the dangerous 
freedom of practicing law without accountability"); Amy L. Leisinger, Commen~ A Criminal 
Defendant"s Inability to Sue His Lawyer Jar Malpractice: The Olher Side oj the Exoneration Rule 
{Canaan v. Bartee, 72 P.Jd 9/ / (Kan. 2003)J, 44 W ASHBUlU"I L.l. 693, 694 (2005) (arguing that the 
"exoneration rule protects undeserving defense attorneys and unduly burdens criminal defendants 
wbo deserve competent and careful legal counsel"); Roy Ryden Anderson, Hey Walter: Do 
Criminal DeJense Lawyers Not Owe Fiduciary Dolies 10 Guilty ClienlS? An Open leiter to Relired 
ProJessor Waller W. Sleele. Jr., 52 SMU L. REv. 661, 674 (1999) (suggesting thai an exoneration 
requirement gives "attorneys who have sold their clients down the river one heck of an incentive to 
go ahead and sink the boat they put their clients on"); Kevin Bennurdo, Note, A Defense Bar: The 
"Proo/a/Innocence" Requirement in Criminal Malpractice Claims,S Omo ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 
341 (2007) (arguing that the ''reasoning behind such requirements is faulty"); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTI11JTE, 1998 PROCEEDINGS 133 (1999) (quoting Professor Roger C. Cramton of New York as 
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To begin with, these obstacles to recovery - which are not afftrmative 
defenses, but additional re~uirements in the plaintiff's prima facie casel37-are 
simply doctrinal overkill." If the concern is that an undeserving claim will 
succeed, there is little cause for worry. It is difftcult for even appealing and 
sympathetic plaintiffs with good facts to prevail on malpractice c1aims.139 
Presumably, it is all the more challenging for one carrying the stigma of actual or 
apparent criminality to do SO.I40 The difficulty of finding an attorney to initiate a 
malpractice action, 141 the nature of the jury system,I42 the demanding 
stating that the "major argument" against an exoneration requirement is that "essentially this puts a 
convicted person, unlike a civil litigant, unlike a client generally. in a situation of proving 
constitutional rights have been violated in order to get an effective relief against inadequate 
lawyering"). 
136 See King, supra note 30, at 1057-61 (refuting in detail the proffered justifications for 
exoneration or innocence requirements in criminal malpractice litigation). 
131 See Christopher Scott Maravilla, Monday Morning LQW)Iering: Proximate Cause and the 
Requirement of Actuallnnocence in a Criminol Defense Malpractice Action, 16 WIDENER L.J. 131, 
133 (2006) (explaining that "in order for the fanner attorney's negligence to have proximately 
caused the plaintifrs hann, the former criminal defendant must establish that it was the attorney's 
negligent representation, not the plaintifFs own criminal behavior, that led to the harm suffered. 
The courts' reason is that the fanner criminal defendant's own actions. not the alleged negligence 
of defense counsel. are the cause in fact of his or her conviction."). 
138 The overkill is all the greater in states that follow a "two-track approach" in calculating the 
running of the statute of limitations on a legal malpractice claim. In these states, the running of the 
statute is not suspended while the criminal defendant pursues post-conviction relief. Rather, the 
convicted (and presumably incarcerated) defendant must simultaneously pursue a claim for post-
conviction relief in criminal proceedings and a legal malpractice claim in civil proceedings. See 
Ereth v. Cascade County, 81 P.3d 463, 469 (Mont. 2003) (endorsing a two-track approach, but 
noting that a trial court handling the civil suit would have discretion to grant a stay "keeping in 
mind the nature of the claim asserted for postconviction relief'); McKnight v. Office of Public 
Defender, 936 A.2d 1036, 1043 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (similar). 
". See, e.g., Alexander v. Turtur & Assoes., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2004) (holding that a 
malpractice claim, based on a finn's substitution ofan inexperienced. unprepared associate as trial 
counsel, was not actionable because of the demanding standards that govern proof of causation). 
See also Kelli M. Hinson and Elizabeth A. Synder, Recent Developments in Texas Legal 
Malpractice Law, 38 ST. MARY's L.J. 1003, 1021-24 (2007) (discussing causation and other 
obstacles to recovery). 
'40 See AMERICAN LAW INS1TIl)TE, 1997 PROCEEDINGS 352 (1998) (quoting Professor Roger C. 
Cramton of New York as arguing against an exoneration or innocence requirement because in a 
malpractice action under ordinary causation rules, ''proof of the goilt of the defendant will be taken 
into account by the judge and jnry"). 
141 It is not as hard as it once was to find an attorney willing to sue another attorney. However, 
lawyers who work on a contingent fee basis, as many malpractice plaintiff's lawyers do, carefully 
screen their cases, because if the claim cannot be sold to the jnry, the lawyer will not get paid. See 
Tort Law in America. supra note 16, at 244. Lawyers know that a person accused or convicted of 
crime may well be viewed with disdain by memben; of the jnry. It seems likely that a plainrifrs 
attorney working on a contingent fee will be reluctant to champion the cause of a person alleging 
defective criminal representation. except in the strongest of cases. 
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requirements of the "trial within a trial" causation analysis,I43 and the rules that 
protect a lawyer's exercise of discretion144 all conspire to defeat a malpractice 
claim raised by one charged with or convicted of a crime. 14S Is it really necessary 
or appropriate to erect additional barriers to liability in the form of exoneration or 
innocence requirements? Probably not. l46 Indeed, in some cases it is simply 
impossible for a convicted criminal to obtain post-conviction relief for procedural 
reasons. During the American Law Institute's debate over whether the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers should endorse an 
exoneration requirement, one member told the assembled judges, lawyers, and 
law professors: 
I have seen ... an actual case, where you have a clear Miranda violation, 
where the defense lawyer, for whatever reason, does not raise it. To me that 
is clearly malpractice, yet, in a post-conviction proceeding, because the point 
was not raised [at trial), it would almost certainly be held procedurally 
barred .... [R)equiring that the conviction be set aside, in a post-conviction 
proceeding, is a very unrealistic and unworkable idea. 147 
142 See Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 1683, 1704 (2006) (mising doubts as to whether lawyers are adept at removing unsympathetic 
or hostile persons from the jury pool); but see Jennifer Knauth. Legal Malpractice: When Ihe Legal 
System Turns on the Lawyer, 35 ST. MARv's L.J. 963, 969 (2004)(opiuing that "ifthe jury is asked 
to choose between identitying with the client in a legal malpractice case or identitying with the 
lawyer, the client is at a distinct advantage and the lawyer a significant disadvantage''). 
143 See, e.g., Anbeluk v. Ohlsen, 390 F. Supp. 2d 865, 869-70 (D.N.D. 2005) (stating that "[t]he 
lease within a case' doctrine requires the client to prove that, but for the attorney's alleged 
negligence, the litigation would have been concluded in a manner more favorable to the client"); cj 
Holley v. Massie, 654 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding in a malpractice action 
that, even if a client's attorney "fell asleep twice at trial," there was no evidence that the attorney's 
conduct caused damage because "[ w Je must assume that jurors take conscientiously their 
responsibility to decide the outcome of the trial in accord with ... the evidence presented to them" 
and "[c]ounsel's sleeping during trial is not evidence"). 
144 See Steven Wisotsky, Appellate Malpractice, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 577, 590-93 (2002) 
(discussing the "honest exercise of professional judgment" defense). 
145 See also Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer's Holiday, 37 GA. L. REv. 1251, 
1256 (2003) (staliog that "common impediments" to a criminal defendant's legal malpractice action 
may also include an "inability to evade the collateral estoppel bar, failure to circumvent the 
expiration of the statute oflimitations, ... [and] failure to prove a legally cognizable bann"). 
146 But see Nick Hedding, Notes and Comments: The Fine Line Between StrategiC Miscalculation 
and Bannfol Error: Consequences and ReperCUSSions of Legal Malpractice to the Criminal 
Defense AI/orney, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 222 (2002) (argning that even ao actual inoocence 
requirement is insufficiently protective of the interests of criminal defense attorneys and legislation 
should be enacted to "require that hafore the malpractice claim may be filed it must contain direct 
evidence that the defense counsel in a criminal case had the ability, based on the evidence available 
at the time of disposition or trial, to demonstrate the reasonable doubt necessary to dissuade a 
possible finding of gnilt"). 
147 See AMERICAN LAW INSTl1UTE, 1997 PROCEEDINGS 353 (1998) (quoting James L. Robertson of 
Mississippi). 
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In addition, exoneration or innocence requirements are of dubious value 
from the standpoint oflegal deterrence. In the sphere of criminal defense work, 
there are virtually no legal mechanisms for enforcing the standards of conduct 
that should be observed by attorneys.148 Requests for post-conviction relief based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel seldom succeed.14• Disciplinary sanctions 
against errant criminal defense lawyers are a rarity. I so And motions for 
disqualification lSI or disgorgement of feeslS2 are essentially unheard of in the 
world of criminal representation. The threat of malpractice liability - however 
difficult it may be for a claim to succeed - can serve a salutary purpose. That 
risk tends to ensure some form of lawyer accountability to the professional 
obligations - including the duties of diligence,1S3 competence,l54 and 
148 See Johanna M. Hickman, Current Developments 2004~2005: Recent Developments in Ihe Area 
of Criminal Malpractice, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 797, 797 (2005) (concluding that "[c]riminal 
defendants ... have few options available to rectify the harm caused by lawyers who fail to live up 
to the standards of their profession"). One non-legal enforcement mechanism that does have the 
potential to deter improper attorney conduct is bad publicity. Stories in the media can focus 
attention on alleged attorney misdeeds. See. e.g .• Karisa King, Dual Legal Role Debated, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 10, 2008, at Al (presenting an extensive front-page inquiry into 
whether criminal defense attorneys who also serve as bail bondsmen for their clients have conflicts 
of interest). The problem i. the attention of the press to ethics issues is haphazard. q: Vincent R. 
Joboson, Regulating Lobbyists: Low, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J. L. & Pus. POL'y I, 
54 (2006) (noting that media scrutiny of ethics problems is hampered by "the limited resources of 
many newspapers and broadcasters, as well as the distraction of other public events that command 
reporters' attention"). 
'49 See Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, 
and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1118 (1999) (reporting 
that "[ c ]hallenges based on ineffective assistance of collOsel are the most frequently filed claims in 
both federal and state post-conviction relief proceedings" but "are often llOsuccessful because of 
the rigid test that determines whether ineffectiveness rises to a constitutionally .igoificant level"). 
'" See Duocan, supra note 135, at 43 (stating that "not one jurisdiction seems actively to use the 
disciplinary process to protect criminal defendants from incompetent criminal defense 
representation, even though doing so could help to compensate for the shortcomings of the 
constitutional and civil safeguards''), 
151 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIlE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 6 (2000) (discussing remedies 
for lawyer wrongs, including disqualification). 
152 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) (discussing forfeiture 
of fees based on "clear and serious violation of duty" to a client). 
153 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONOUCT R. 1.3 (2007) (discussing the duties of diligence and 
promptoess). 
154 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONOUCT R. 1.1 cmts. 1-6 (2007) (discussing the duty of 
competence, including obligations pertaining to knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation). 
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communicationl55 - that should animate the zealous and faithful representation 
of all c1ients,156 including criminal defendants who are guilty. 
The cynical explanation for the rush by states to adopt exoneration and 
innocence requirements that bar malpractice actions is that this is ~ust another 
effort to limit the rights of criminals and those suspected of crimes. 57 In other 
words, one might argue, these requirements are just another part of the ongoing 
"war on crime. ,,158 
However, a more convincing explanation is that proponents of these rules 
were concerned about the risk of poorly-compensated criminal defense attorneys, 
often appointed by courts, being deluged with malpractice claims filed by 
prisoners. When the American Law Institute adopted its variation of the 
exoneration requirement, 159 one member argued, in terms that others have 
voiced: 160 "Most of the litigants will be prisoners, and ... litigation can be at 
least a form of therapy, if not recreation. This will result in ... suits against 
lawyers, and it will result in congestion of the courts in terms of a huge host of 
frivolous litigation .... ,,161 Another member echoed the same theme, urging 
that: 
The social consequence of enabling . . . [a flood of litigation 1 from the 
prisoner libraries to go against the handful of lawyers who get into this area 
[of criminal representation 1 and defend these people, at great value to the 
community, is to deter lawyers from getting into this area. It is bad public 
policy. 162 
'" See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2007) (discussing the duty of communication); 
"Absolute and Perfoct" Candor, supra note 128, at 742-51 (discussing competing formulations of 
principles governing disclosure obligations), 
'56 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. I (2007) (stating that a "lawyer must ... act 
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client's behalf'). 
JS7 Cf Beonardo, supra note 135, at 361 (opining that "some justifications proffered for the proof-
of·actual~jrmocence reqUirement smack of little more than hostility towards convicts bringing 
criminal malpractice lawsuits"), , 
,,, Cf V. F. Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39 TuLSA L. REv. 925, 
928-29 (2004) (asserting that "[a]lmost every presidenl since [Franklin Roosevelt] has waged war 
on crime, whether a small one (as Eisenhower's battle against juvenile delinquency) or a fierce one 
(like Kennedy's battle against organized crime), one primarily focused on predators (as Reagan's), 
or one disastrously focused on political enemies (as Nixon's)"). 
159 See RESTATEMENT(TiuRD) OF TORTS § 53 cm!. d (2000) (requiring the conviction to be set aside, 
but not requiring proof of innocence). 
,60 See Bennardo, supra nole 135, at 348 (asserting that "[n]umerous jurisdictions state that 
requiring proof of post-conviction relief win prevent frivolous malpractice lawsuits"). 
'" AMERICAN LAW iNSTI11ITE, 1998 PROCEEDINGS 132 (1999) (comments of Chief Judge D. Brock 
Hornby of Maine). 
'" AMERICAN LAW INsTI11JTE, 1998 PROCEEDINGS 134 ( (999) (comments of Sheldon H. Elsen of 
New York). 
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These are legitimate concerns. 163 Yet, whether they are strong enough to 
always trump society's interest in affording a damages remedy to persons harmed 
by negligent criminal representation is far from clear. Other alternatives are 
available. Appointed lawyers could be protected by some variety of immunity. 1M 
Criminal defense lawyers who charge a full fee could be expected to protect 
themselves from the costs of claims the way other lawyers do: by practicing 
preventive lawyering and purchasing malpractice insurance. 
A plaintiff's unlawful conduct should bar recovery in a tort action only in 
cases where the plaintiff's default is great and only if that misdeed is related to 
the attorney's negligence in such a way that it is fair to totally foreclose recovery. 
The cases imposing an exoneration or innocence requirement on plaintiffs suing 
for malpractice arising from criminal defense work sweep much too broadly to 
honor these important factors. 
B. In Pari Delicto 
Another indication that legal malpractice law already endorses an unlawful 
conduct obstacle to recovery is that cases hold that an action for damages is 
barred by the affrrmative defense of ivari delicto. 16s Parties stand "in pari 
delicto" when they are equally at fault. I According to the Latin maxim in pari 
delicto potior est conditio defendentis, "in a case of equal or mutual fault ... the 
'6' Cf Pamela A. MacLean, Inmate Petitions Swamp Judges, NAT'L L.1., Aug. 4, 2008 at 4 
(discussing how thousands of state prisoner petitions swamped certain California courts, prompting 
a call for help from other parts of the judiciary). 
'64 For example, Osborne v. Goodlet, No. M2003'()3118-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1713868, (Tenn. 
Ct. App. July 22, 2005), held that an assistant public defender was immune from suit for 
malpractice under either of two state laws. But see Bamer v. Leeds, 13 PJd 704, 705-14 (Cal. 
2000) (holding that state public defenders are not immune from suit). 
Appuinted lawyers could be treated as the equivalent of volunteers, particularly where 
they are not paid for their services. Numerous jurisdictions immunized volunteers from liability. 
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-106 (West 2007) (creating immunity for volunteer retired 
physicians who provide services at low-cost mediea1 clinics); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2799.5 
(Westlaw 2007) (providing immunity to health care providers who provide free services at 
community clinics); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 5-425(b) (Westlaw 2007) (conferring 
immunity on professional engineers who, upon request of state officials, volunteer at the scene of 
an emergency, disaster, or catastrophic event); TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.053 ( Vernon 2007) 
(stating that a '''volunteer who is serving as a direct service volunteer of a school district is immune 
from civil liability to the same extent as a professional employee of a school district"); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 55-7-19 (2007) (limiting liability of physicians who volunteer for certain athletic 
events sponsored by a public or private elementary or secondary school). 
'6' See, e.g., Mosier v. Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C., No. 2:06-CV-519, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
67599 (D. Utah Sept. II, 2007) (barring an action by a corporate trustee against a law firm where 
the evidence left no doubt that the debtor's officers and directors engaged in willful misconduct). 
,66 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the Latin term in pari delicto as 
meaning "in equal fault"). 
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position of the [defending] party ... is the better one.,,167 Put differently, "[i]n 
the familiar economic language of the Chicago School, among wrongdoers 
equally at fault the law ought not to redistribute losses caused by the wrong itself, 
but rather should leave the parties where it finds them. ,,168 Under the rule of in 
pari delicto, the "[ s ]uit is barred not because the defendant is right, but rather 
because the Dlaintiff, being equally wrong, has forfeited any claim to the aid of 
the court. ,,169' 
The in pari delicto defense "is grounded on two premises: first, that courts 
should not lend their good offices to mediating disputes among wrongdoers; and 
second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an -effective 
means of deterring iIlegality.,,'70 The effect of the in ~ari delicto doctrine is that 
generally ''there is no recourse between wrongdoers." , 
Numerous legal malpractice claims have been barred by the in pari delicto 
doctrine.172 Generally, those cases have involved clients who lied to courts on 
their attorneys' advice. A client who has engaged in such knowingly wrongful 
conduct is typically barred from recovering damages in a malpractice action for 
losses that arise from the perjury. m 
The doctrine of in pari delicto covers some of the same ground as the 
general wrongful conduct defense discussed above.174 Thus, one court wrote 
simply, without reference to the defendant's degree of fault, that "[t]he doctrine 
'67 Marwil v. Cluff, 1 :03-CY-0787-DFH-JMS, 2007 WL 2608845, at "7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2007) 
(citation omitted). See also Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting the phrase quoted in the 
text as meaning "where the wrong of the one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the 
stronger position"). 
'68 Pantelyv. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 447 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
'69 Id at 867. 
170 Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985). 
17' Patten v. Raddatz, 895 P.2d 633, 635 (Mont. 1995) (barring a tort action arising from a long-
term relationship involving drug use and prostitution). 
172 See, e.g., Tillman v. Shomer, 90 P.3d 582, 584-87 (Okla Civ. App. 2004) (holding that a claim 
against an attorney for legal malpractice was barred under the doctrine of In pari delicto where the 
dsmages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff client arose from a criminal conspiracy to defraud the 
Internal Revenue Service and the United States Bankruptcy Court, to which both the attorney and 
the client had pled guilty). 
I7J See, e.g., Turner v. Anderson, 704 So. 2d 748, 752 (pIa Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the 
doctrine of in pari delicto barred a client's suit against attorneys who allegedly advised him to 
commit peIjury); Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 447 N.W.2d 864, 868-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that an attorney was not liable for legal malpractice in allegedly counseling a client 
to lie that she had lived in the county for at least ten days before ber divorce complaint was filed, 
because the client was in pari delicto); Evans v. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Wis. 1985) 
(holding that in pari delicto barred a client from recovering from an attorney for damages allegedly 
suffered as a result of lying under oath in a bankruptcy proceeding, pursuant to the attorney's 
advice). 
174 See supra Part II. 
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of in pari delicto is the 'principle that a plaintiff who has particifsated in 
wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting from the wrongdoing. ",I 5 
As an aid to legal analysis, a carefully conceptualized wrongful conduct 
defense has two advantages over the doctrine of in pari delicto. The first is 
clarity and the second is focus. Courts recognizing a wrongful conduct defense 
(at least in tort cases not involving legal malpractice) often endeavor to be clear 
about what type of conduct gives rise to the defense and how closely that conduct 
must be related to the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery.176 The same 
has not always been true of courts applying the in pari delicto doctrine. Courts 
sometimes say that the doctrine is applicable to any case involving "an immoral 
or illegal transaction ... [entailing] moral turpitude.,,177 By referring to 
"immorality," those courts greatly and imprecisely expand the range of offending 
conduct that might trigger the defense and, by requiring "moral turpitude," the~ 
raise all of the issues and disagreements that have surrounded that phrase.1 
Moreover, the Latin name of the in pari delicto doctrine itself and the maxim 
quoted aboveJ7• do little to enhance clarity in analysis or certainty in application. 
More significantly, by focusing on whether the parties are "equally at 
fault," the in pari delicto doctrine misorients the analysis. The question is not 
whether the plaintiff is equally at fault with the defendant. Indeed, any rule 
I7S Reed v. Cedar County, No. 05-CV-64-LRR, 2007 WL 509186, at·4 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 12,2007). 
See also Orzel by Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Mich. 1995) (stating that "[wJhen 
a plaintiff'S action is based on his own illegal conduct, and the defendant has participated equally in 
the illegal activity, ... the 'doctrine of in pari delicto' generally applies to also bar the plaintiff's 
claim"). 
176 See, e.g., Orzel by Orzel, 537 N.W.2d at 214-15. In Orzel, the court, incidental to a painstaking 
review of the facts, explained: 
The mere fact that a plaintiff engaged in illegal conduct at the time of his injury 
doeJl not mean that his claim is automatically barred under the wrongful-conduct rule. 
To implicate the wrongful-conduct rule, the plaintiff's conduct must be prohibited or 
almost entirely prohibited under a penal or criminal statute. Cases in which the 
wrongful-conduct rule has been applied include: ... [an illegal lottery; trespass and 
gambling; illegal contract; murder; embezzlement; peIjury; and arson]. 
In contrast, where the plaintiff's illegal act only amounts to a violation of a safety 
statute, such as traffic and speed laws or requirements for a safe work place, the 
plaintiff's act, while illegal, does not rise to the level of serious misconduct sufficient 
to bar a cause of action by application of the wrongful-conduct rule .... 
Another important limitation under the wrongful-conduct rule involves causation. 
For the wrongful-conduct rule to apply, a sufficient causal nexus must exist between 
the plaintiff's illegal conduct and the plaintiff's asserted damages .... /d. (intemal 
citations omined). 
177 Tillman, 90 P.3d at 584 (quoting Bowlan v. Lunsford, 54 P.2d 666, 668 (Okla. 1936». 
178 See, e.g., CliARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL Ennes 92-93 (1986) (discussing the problem 
of defining "moral turpitude"). See also 1 WAYNE R. LA!' AYE, SUBST AN11VE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6 
(c) (2d ed. 2007); RONALD D. ROl1.lNDA & JOlIN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL Ennes: THE LAWYER'S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 8.4-2 (c) (2008'()9 ed.). But see Jordan v. De 
George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951); In re Calaway, 570 P.2d 1223 (Cal. 1977). 
179 See supra text accompanying note 167. 
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framed in tenns of an equality requirement would be both rarely useful and the 
subject of frequent dispute. In only one in a hundred cases-the fifty-fifty 
case--will the plaintiff and defendant be equally at fault. If recovery were barred 
only in such instances, there would be endless litigation over whether the 
plaintiff and defendant were to blame to precisely the same extent. Yet this is 
generally not what modem courtslSO are looking for when they speak of in pari 
delicto. In some cases, what the courts mean is that the plaintiff's knowing 
participation in unlawful conduct was so serious and so closely connected to the 
damages for which recovery is sought that it is fair to foreclose recovery. 181 If 
that is so, it is far preferable to address those considerations (the seriousness of 
the plaintiff's conduct and its relationship to the plaintiff's harm) under an 
unlawful conduct defense that expressly incorporates those factors than by 
invoking the imprecise language of in pari delicto. In other cases, what the 
courts mean when they invoke the phrase in pari delicto is that the plaintiff was 
more at fault than the defendant. Thus, in one recent legal malpractice case, the 
court held that a claim against an attorney for negligence was barred by in pari 
delicto because the plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent conduct. l82 As the court 
explained, the claim was foreclosed from judicial consideration because "[tJhe 
actual fraud of Mr. Gosman [the client~ is more objectionable than the alleged 
negligence of Peabody [the attorney]." 3 Cases like this illustrate two points. 
First, it makes little sense to talk about the relevant defense in the language of "in 
pari delicto" if the question is not whether the plaintiff was equally at fault, but 
rather more at fault. Second, if a comparison between the fault of the parties is to 
be made, that inquiry may be better framed in the language of comparative 
180 But see O'Halloran v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 969 So. 2d 1039, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007) (stating "[i]n its classic formulation, the In pari delicto defense was narrowly limited to 
situations where the plaintiff buly bore at least substantially equal responsibility for his injury, 
because 'in cases where both parties are in delicto, concurring in an illegal act, it does not always 
follow that they stand in pari delicto; for there may he, and often are, very different degrees in their 
guilt'" (quoting I J. STORY, EQ1JITY JURISPRUDENCE 304-305 (13th ed. 1886)). 
181 Cf Gage v. Network Appliance, Inc., No. BI77657, 2005 WL 3214954 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 
2005). In Gage, the employees of the defendant delihemtely got the plaintiff intoxicated, then 
interfered with a bartender's efforts to call a taxi to take him home. While driving away, the 
inebriated plaintiff was seriously injured in an accident which caused him to he convicted of 
vehicular homicide. There is language in the opinion saying that «Grant and Iversioo's 
reprehensible conduct preceded plaintiff's equally reprehensible decision to drive home while 
intoxicated." Id. at ·5. However, the court was more concerned with plaintiffs own serious 
unlawful conduct, than with parity offault. The court wrote: 
[P]laintiff cannot escape responsibility for his own fault simply because ... [the 
defendant's employees'] conduct was a concurrent cause ofbis injuries. Inasmuch as 
plaintiff was his own last line of defense and he was a cause of his own injuries, he 
cannot plead facts negating that his irijuries were proximately caused by his 
commission of a felony. 
ld at '5. The court held that any action against the defendant was barred by the plaintiff's felony 
conviction. Id. at ·5. 
182 See In re Gosman, 382 B.R. 826,838 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
183 ld (emphasis added). 
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negligence or comparative fault than in terms of whether a total defense 
precludes recovery (regardless of whether that defense is called in pari delicto, 
unlawful conduct, or something else). The relationship between the wrongful 
conduct defense and comparative principles is discussed below.l84 
Courts recognizing the in pari delicto doctrine sometimes do not apply it 
because the defendant was more at fault than the plaintiff. ISS In those cases, the 
parties, in fact, are not in pari delicto, so it is not surprising that a defense so 
named is inapplicable. However, this line of reasoning finds less application in 
legal malpractice cases than one might expect. 186 If a client lies under oathlS7 or 
184 See infra Pan IV. 
18' See In re Gosman, 382 B.R. al 838 (stating, in a legal malpractice action, Ihat the doctrine of in 
pari delicto is inapplicable if the plaintiffs fault is far less in degree than the defendant's); Orzel by 
Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 217 (Mich. 1995)(opining that "a plainliffmay still seek 
recovery against the defendant if the defendant'S culpability is greater than the plaintiffs 
culpability for the injuries," such as where the plaintiff has acted "under circumstances of 
oppression, imposition. hardship, undue influence, or great inequality of condition or age .. .. "); 
McKinley v. Weidner, 698 P.2d 983, (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a client was not equally at 
fault with an attorney where the client, on the attorney's advice, tendered a check with an intention 
to dishonor check as part of ploy to recover possession of a boat from a third party. and therefore 
the client's legal malpractice action was not barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto). 
In Hudson v. Cr'lfl, 204 P.2d I (Cal. 1949), an 18-year-old partiCipant in an illegal boxing 
match sued the promoter of the match for injuries he sustained. The court found that the boxing 
law, which required licensing and safety precautions. was intended to protect persons engaging in 
the activity from physical harm, rather than boxing promoters. Consequently, the plaintiff 
participant and the defendant promoter were not in pari delicto, and a suit against the promoter 
could be maintained, even though the plaintiff may have been criminally liable and might have 
been barred from suing another participant for injuries sustained. A similar line of reasoning could 
be developed in legal malpractice cases. Attorneys, it might be argued, have a greater obligation to 
ensure the integrity of the administration of justice than mere litigants, and that obligation is 
intended, at least in part, to protect litigants. Therefore, when a client, on an attorney's advice, lies 
to a court, it might be argued that the lawyer is more at fault than the client, and that a client's 
claim against the lawyer should not be barred in its entirety, even if recovery might be reduced to 
reflect the client's share of the fault. 
'86 See In re Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp. , 353 B.R. 324, 369 (Bankr. D. Col. 2006) (rejecting an 
argument that law firm defendants sued for malpractice "ought not be allowed to invoke the in pari 
delicto defense because lawyers owe a special duty of care to their clients"). See also Abbott v. 
Marker, 722 N.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting, in the context of an illegal fee-
splitting agreement between a non-lawyer and a lawyer, the argument that the parties to the 
agreement were not In pari delicto). But see Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 699 N.W.2d 54, 64 (Wis. 
2005) (holding that a legal malpractice action was not barred on the ground that the plaintiff client 
was in par; delicto where the attorney had asserted before the Securities Commissioner that the 
client's actions were not illegal). 
187 See Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 447 N.W.2d 864, 868.{j9 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) 
(finding attorney and client equally at fault); Evans v. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Wis. 1985) 
(same); see also Choquette v. Isacoff, 836 N.E.2d 329, 334-35 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (similar). 
In Pantely, the court wrote: 
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files a faIse affidavitl88 based on an attorney's advice, courts are generally 
disinclined to inquire into whether the attorney was more at fault than the 
client.189 Rather, the courts seem to be influenced more by the plaintiff's serious 
unlawful conduct and its connection to the plaintiff's conduct, than by the extent 
of the defendant's own blameworthiness.l90 If that is true, it would be preferable 
to consider the issue in terms of a clearly articulated unlawful conduct defense, 
rather than under the clumsy language of in pari delicto. 
C, Unclean Hands 
A number of cases have held that a legal malpractice claim may be barred 
by the doctrine of unclean hands. Some of these decisions have involved clients 
who committed peIjury based on an attorney's advice.19I Others have arisen 
First, Ms. Pantely denies sbe is equally at fault .... After all, sbe says, she lied at 
the direction of her attorneys at a time wben she was emotionally distraught and 
desperate to secure a divorce. In sum, she contends ... that her wrongdoing is less 
reprehensible than that of her I.wy .... 
We can readily envision legal m.tters so complex and ethical dilemmas so 
profound that a client could follow an attorney's advice, do wrong and still maintain 
suit on the basis of not being equally .t fault. But peJjury is not complex; and telJing 
the truth poses no dilemma . ... More pointedly. it is a crime .... A law degree does 
not add to one's awareness that perjury is immoral and illegal. any more than an 
accounting degree adds to one's .wareness that tax fraud is immoral and illegal. 
447 N.W.2d at 868. But see Bennan v. Coakley, 137 N.E. 667, 670 (Mass. 1923) (noting th.t an 
"attorney and client do not deal with each other at ann's length" and that the "client often is in 
many respects powerless to resist the influence of his attorney," and holding, in an action involving 
an illegal contract, • lawyer and client were not in pari delicto). 
,88 See General Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & W.tennan, 557 N.W.2d 274 (low. 1996) 
(finding client and I.w firm equ.Uy culp.ble). 
,89 See, e.g., Tillman v. Shomer, 90 P.3d 582, 585 (Oklo. Civ. App. 2004) (rejecting a client's 
argument that "she was not quite as guilty" as her attorney with respect to a scheme to defraud the 
government). Cj RESTATEMENT (TinRD) OF TIlE LAW GoVERNING LAWYERS § 29 em!. • (2000) 
(stating that "[.) client involved in litig.tion might seek to avoid a sanction on the ground that 
counsel rather than the client has been to blame for. default .... [In this situation,) tribunals are 
often reluctant to let a client esc.pe responsibility but wiU nevertheless consider evidence to that 
effect"). But see In re A1masri, 378 B.R. 550, 556 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (declining to grant an 
attomeyts motion to dismiss because it was not clear that the debtor was "at least as culpable" as 
the debtor's counsel, if the .Uegation in the complaint were true). 
,90 Cj Butler v. Mooers, 771 A.2d 1034, 1036-37 (Me. 2001). In a leg.1 malpractice case where 
the in par; delicto defense was asserted. the court focused on 8 causation rationale for denying 
recovery; "even if we assume that Mooers negligently provided Butler with inaccurate legal advice, 
Butler's plea of guilty and his .cknowledgment that he 'knowingly and wiUfuUy' defrauded the 
banks precludes • finding th.t his criminal conduct was nonetheless proximately caused by 
Mooers' negligent legal advice." [d. 
'91 See Blain v. Doctor's Co., 272 C.1. Rptr. 250, 258-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding th.t the 
doctrine of unclean bands barred a physician'S legal malpractice cl.ims for emotion.1 distress and 
loss ofth. ability to practice medicine); Kirkland v. Mannis, 639 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. CI. App. 1982) 
(holding th.t where. client and attorney "cooperatively presented. peJjurious tale" at the client's 
tri.I, • malpractice claim 'gainst the .ttorney was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands). 
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from very different contexts. In one case, a lender who had previously been 
found liable for a violation of the state Interest Act in a suit commenced against 
him by a borrower was precluded from litigating a claim that his violation 
resulted from incorrect advice provided to him by his attorney.l92 The court 
found it irrelevant that the earlier case did not involve fraud because the relevant 
principle was that "courts do not aid parties whose causes of action are founded 
on any illegal or immoral acts, including the violation of a statute, to assert rights 
growing out of such acts or to relieve themselves of the consequences of those 
acts .... ,,193 This formulation of an unlawful conduct bar to legal malpractice 
liability is exceptionally broad and creates an unreasonable and unnecessary risk 
that relief will be foreclosed in a range of cases far wider than is appropriate. 
Throughout the law of torts, a statutory violation by the plaintiff, even if 
proximately causing the plaintiff's injuries, is normally not a total bar to relief, 
but only an obstacle to recovery to the extent ~rovided by applicable principles of 
comparative negligence or comparative fault. 94 "Immoral" conduct that is not a 
violation of legislative or common-law rules is not a defense at all. And whether 
recovery is permitted or foreclosed is determined by reference to well-developed 
principles of proximate causation, not whether the rights asserted "grow out of' 
particular acts. 
Applying the doctrine of unclean hands to legal malpractice cases is not a 
useful path of analysis for at least two reasons. First, unclean hands is an 
equitable defense that properly has no application when legal relief, such as a 
request for damages, is an issue.195 Second, the rubric of ''unclean hands" 
obfuscates the issue of just what type of conduct gives rise to the defense or how 
closely that conduct must be connected to the relief being sought in order for the 
action to be barred. The better path is to forego the opaque language of "unclean 
hands" and engage in a careful analysis of the facts in light of a clearly 
articulated unlawful conduct defense. 
Kirkland's reliance on unclean hands was disavowed by a later case which preferred to analyze the 
case under the nomenclature of in pari delicto. See McKinley v. Weidner, 698 P 2d 983, 985-86 
(Or. Ct. App. 1985). 
"2 See Buttitta v. Newell, 531 N.E.2d 957, 960-61 (III. Ct. App. 1988). 
"] [d. at 961. 
194 See generally RESTATEMENT ('fJnRD) OF TORTS § 14 (2005) (discussing statutory violations as 
negligence per se). 
". See DAN B. DoBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES 68 (2d ed. 1993) (''The most orthodox view of the 
unclean hands doctrine makes it an equitable defense, that is, one that can be raised to defeat an 
equitable remedy. but not one that defeats other remedies"). Malpractice actions often include 
claims for disgorgement of fees, as well as claims for damages. See Steve McConnico & Robyn 
Bigelow, Summary of Recent Developments in Texas Legal Malpractice Law, 33 ST. MARy's L.J. 
607, 625-35 (2002) (discussing fee forfeiture claims). Disgorgement is an equitable remedy that 
might, at least theoretically, be defeated by the unclean hands doctrine. 
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D. Insider Fraud 
Malpractice actions by business entities or their successors in interest have 
sometimes been barred by what is called the "insider fraud defense."I96 In these 
cases, the question is whether it is fair to impute the fraudulent conduct of entity 
constituents, such as officers or employees, to the entity itself or its successor. A 
complex body of law has evolved relating to these issues. I07 A number of 
exceptions to the general principle of imputation have been recognized. Thus, 
when a constituent acts adversely to the entity, the entity will not be barred from 
pursuing a malpractice claim by the fraudulent conduct of the constituent. lOS In 
these cases the unlawful conduct defense fails even though fraud was 
committed. li• However, if the fraudulent conduct of the agent is imputable to the 
principal, the defense can be asserted, because fraud is uniformly regarded as a 
serious form of unlawful conduct. Some of the cases addressing the issue of 
whether insider fraud will be imputed to an entity or successor in interest to bar a 
legal ma~ractice claim address the issue within the rubric of the in pari delicto 
doctrine. 0 
E. Latk of Proximate Causation 
It is possible to speak of the plaintiffs unlawful conduct not as an 
affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the defendant, but as an obstacle 
to the plaintiffs proof of a prima facie case of liability. For example, Shahbaz v. 
". See also Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, L.L.C. v. Shapiro, No. 06 Civ. 6468(KMW)(MHD), 
2008 WL 833237, at'4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2008) (holding that a receiver's claims against law finn 
defendants were based on allegations that they assisted the individual defendants in committing 
fraud, and therefore the receiver could not assert those claims, whether framed as legal malpractice 
or otherwise). 
107 Cf O'Halloran v. PricewaterhouseCoopers L.L.P., 969 So. 2d 1039, 1044-46 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. 
App. 2007) (offering an extensive discussion of imputation principles in the context of accounting 
malpractice). 
198 See Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, 268 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(discussing the "adverse interest exception" to the fraudulent conduct imputation rule). See also 
O'Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.s. 79, 84 (1994) (holding, in a legal malpractice action, 
that state law, not federal law. governs the imputation afknowledge to corporate victims). 
199 Cf In re Hampton Hotel investors, L.P., 289 B.R. 563, 578 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding 
that an allegation of facts within the terms of the adverse interest exception to the fraudulent 
conduct defense prevented dismissal of claims against a law firm). See also In re Fuzion 
Technologies Group, Inc., 332 B.R. 225, 236-37 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (finding that even if the In 
pari delicto defense applied to a bankruptcy trustee, under Florida law it remained unavailable to 
the defendant law firm because the CEO's intentional misconduct could not be imputed to the 
debtor). But see In re Dublin Securities, Inc., 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the 
doctrine of in pari delicto was properly applied to preclude trustee from pursuing legal malpractice 
claims). 
200 See. e.g., In re Scon Acquisition Corp., 364 B.R. 562 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (holding that a legal 
malpractice action was barred because the adverse interest exception to the in pari delicto defense 
did not apply). 
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Horwiti'°l held that a client who was found guilty of fraud in a civil suit could 
not successfully maintain a negligence action against the law finn that had 
assisted him in the fraudulent transaction, because the proximate causation 
element of a malpractice claim includes "determining cause in fact and 
considering various policy factors that may preclude imposition of liability.,,202 
The court reasoned that just as "an intentional tortfeasor cannot obtain 
contribution from a negligent joint tortfeasor,,203 and "a party [cannot] obtain 
indemnity or insurance for intentional wrongdoing,,,204 so too "[P]ublic policy 
forbids intentional tortfeasors . . . from shifting their liability for intentional 
wrongdoing to their negligent attorneys. ,,205 Although the court acknowledged 
that "[0 ]ther states have barred intentional wrongdoers from bringing malpractice 
actions against negligent attorneys under the doctrine, in pari delicto,,,206 it found 
that the defendants' "contentions reduce[d] to an attack on proximate 
causation. ,,207 
In framing the issue in causation terms, the Shahbaz court followed 
essentially the same path that states have taken in holding that plaintiffs must 
prove exoneration or innocence when alleging negligence in the context of 
criminal representation. It viewed the critical issue as one of causation and 
adopted a rule that effectively insulates an entire class of attorneys from liability 
for malpractice, namely those attorneys who represent persons ultimately found 
liable for fraud. 20. As with the exoneration or innocence requirements that apply 
in suits against criminal defense attorneys, it is possible to ask whether this line 
of analysis in cases involving client fraud results in doctrinal overkill. 
IV. COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT DEFENSE 
As Parts II and III demonstrate, commission of unlawful conduct closes the 
courthouse doors to plaintiffs in a broad range of cases involving tort claims in 
general and legal malpractice claims in particular. Thus, todak the law is 
considerably different than when the fust and second Restatements rejected an 
outlaw doctrine and announced that the mere commission of a crime or tort did 
'01 No. 0037299,2008 WL 808034 (Cal. Ct. App. March 27, 2008). 
'02 Id. at'9 (quoting Viner v. wee~ 70 P.3d 1046. 1048 n.1 (Cal. 2003)). 
20. Id. at'\O (citation omitted). 
'"'Id. 
20S Id at .9. 
20' Id. at '10 n.9. 
2071d. at '9. 
208 A person convicted of crime may rebut the presumption that the crime, not the lawyer's 
malpractice, caused the resulting harm by proving exoneration of the crime and, in some states, 
innocence. See supra Part lILA. Similarly, the Shahbaz court allowed the possibility tbat, not 
withstanding a mud judgmen~ the public policy obstacle to proof of proximate causation may be 
overcome if the plaintiff establishes that be or she was an "innocent principaL" 2008 WL 808034, 
at·11. However, the court found that exception inapplicable to the facts of the case. 
209 See supra Part I. 
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not bar one from recovery for interference with legally protected interests. Yet, 
perhaps the difference is less significant than it might first appear. 
The recent emergence of an unlawful conduct defense in American tort law 
is, in a sense, a restoration of the balance struck, on other grounds, during much 
of the twentieth century regarding the availability of compensation for 
negligence.2IO Even as the first"lI and second212 Restatements rejected an outlaw 
doctrine, they held that a plaintiff's unlawfully tortious or criminal conduct could 
give rise to the defense of contributory negligence.213 Until roughly the early 
1970s, contributory negligence was a total defense to a negligence claim in most 
jurisdictions?14 Thus, recognition of an unlawful conduct defense today in 
negligence cases dictates the same result that was often reached under the 
contributory negligence doctrine in the age of pre-comparative principles. In 
either case, a plaintiff suing in negligence to recover for injuries to which the 
plaintiff's own serious unlawful conduct contributed is barred from receiving 
compensation.2 I 5 
Nevertheless, the widespread endorsement of comparative negligence and 
comparative fault in forty-six states216 cannot be ignored. The substitution of 
proportionality principles211 for the earlier all-or-nothing rule of contributory 
210 See Flanagan v. Baker, 621 N.E2d 1190,1192 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993), which slated: 
"It has been established from early times that one who is violating a criminal statute 
cannot recover for an injury to which his criminality was a directly contributing 
cause," . . .. These cases proceed on the basis that violation of a criminal statute is 
evidence of negligence "in reference to matters to which the statute relates." . . .. It 
logically follows that, where contributory negligence is recognized as a defense in a 
negligence action, such evidence results in a bar to recovery. (Internal citations 
omitted). 
211 See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 889 (1939). 
212 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 889 (1979). 
213 See id. at § 889 cmt. b (Slating that "[c]riminal conduct that ... constitutes negligence or 
recklessness . . . is a defense to an action for harm caused by corresponding negligence or 
recklessness of another"). 
214 See id. § 467 (slating that "[e]xcept where the defendant has the last clear chance [to avoid 
harm], the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery .... "). 
21' Of course. an unlawful conduct defense can be asserted in a suit alleging Dot that an attorney 
acted negligently, but engaged in intentionally tonious conduct, such as fraud. Prior to the 
adoption of comparative law principles. a contributory negligence defense could not be raised in 
such a case and would not have barred recovery. If the same result is true today, the strongest 
argument for that conclusion is that an attorney should not be pennitted to engage in deliberate 
victimization of a person engaged in unlawful conduct. The contrary argument would be that the 
panies, having both knowingly committed unlawful acts, are in pari delicto, and that the coun 
should leave them where it finds them and deny reliefto the plaintiff. See supra pan III.B. 
21. Only four stales and the District of Columbia retain strict common-law contributory negligence: 
Alabama (Bergob v. Scrusby, 855 So. 2d 523 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002»; D.C. (Wingfield v. Peoples 
Drug Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C. 1977»; Maryland (pippin v. Potomac Electric Power 
Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 379, 383 (D. Md. 2001»; North Carolina (Yancey v. Lea, 532 S.E.2d 560, 563 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000 »; and Virginia (Litchford v. Hancock, 352 S.E.2d 335, 337 (Va. 1987». 
217 Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 903, 938 
n.53 (2004) (explaining that "[u]nder a 'pure' comparative [negligence or comparative fault] 
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negligence ranks as the most important development of the field of tort law in the 
last hundred years.218 Today, in a wide range of situations, the law favors the 
view that liability should not only be based on fault, but limited in proportion to 
fault.2I" In that respect, the emergence of an unlawful conduct defense that is a 
total bar to recovery is out of step with the strongest trend in modem American 
tort law because it ignores fault on the part of the defendant and focuses wholly 
on the fault of the plaintiff. Such an approach to issues of lawyer liability is 
infirm because the law should embrace rules that create an incentive for both the 
defendant (the lawyer) and the plaintiff (the client or third person) to exercise 
care to avoid losses that could be minimized through lawful and otherwise 
appropriate conduct.220 Courts should be reluctant to expansively create 
doctrines-such as some versions of the modem unlawful conduct defense-which 
abrogate state comparative law schemes.221 
There is legitimate concern-at least within the legal profession-about the 
tendency in contemporary American society for clients to seek to hold their 
system. damages are allocated in proportion to fault. The same is true under a 'modified' 
comparative system if the plaintiff is less at fault than the defendant(s). However, if the plaintiff is 
more at fault than the defendant(s) in a 'modified' comparative system, the plaintiff recovers 
nothing, in which case damages are not allocated in proportion to fault. "). 
218 Cf. JOHNSON & GUNN. supra note 14, at 798 (discussing the doctrinal implications that arose 
once "contributory negligence began to be supplanted by comparative principles"). 
219 See id. at 7 (uThe proportionality principle seeks to limit or refine application of the fault 
principle. In part, it holds that liability should not be levied on an individual tortfeasor, even if 
fault is shown, if doing so would expose the defendant to a burden that is disproportionately heavy 
or perhaps unlimited."). See also Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Cat. 1975) 
(stating that the contributory negligence doctrine "is inequitable in its operation because it fails to 
distribute responsibility in proportion to fault .... [I]n a system in wbich liability is based on fault, 
the extent of that fault should govern the extent of liability"). In states with "pure" comparative 
negligence or comparative fault, the proportionality principle is given its greatest recognition. In 
states with "modified" comparative negligence or comparative fault, the proportionality prinCiple is 
aetarded precedence within a limited scope. In those states, if the plaintiff's contribution to the 
production of the harm falls short of the 50% threshold, proportional recovery is allowed. If the 
plaintiff's contribution exceeds the 50% thresbol~ no recovery is pemritted, in which case the 
proportionality principle is trumped by otber considerations, including the principle that tbe persons 
sbould exercise individual responsibility to protect their own interests. States with "modified" 
systems differ as to whether they allow proportional recovery or deny recovery in cases where the 
allocation of fault between the plaintiff and defendant(s) is fifty-fifty. 
220 Cf JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 14, at 7 (discussing the idea tbat liability should be imposed to 
deter unnecessary losses), 
221 See Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 574, 577 (N.Y. 2002) (opining that the 
New York common~law unlawful conduct defense "embodies a Darrow application of public policy 
imperatives under limited circumstances" and that it did not bar a products liability claim against a 
car manufacturer by the estate of an intoxicated motorist who died in a crash because so holding 
''would abrogate legislatively mandated comparative fault analysis in a wide range oftort claims"). 
But see Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, P.C., 880 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Tex. App. 1994) 
(holding that because the "appellants' causes of action against appellees ... [were 1 barred by public 
policy. and are therefore invalid," those causes of action could not be presented to a trier of fact 
and, "consequently, an analysis of comparative fault [was] not necessary"). 
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lawyers responsible for whatever losses flow from the clients' endeavors.222 The 
legal rules that govern such actions--including the law of negligence and 
fiduciary duty principles--sometimes make it too easy for plaintiffs to state a 
cause of action and raise triable issues off act that will be decided by a jury. The 
most disturbing claims may be those brought by clients who themselves, either 
personalty or through their representatives, have engaged in serious criminal 
conduct. Allowing such claims to give rise to malpractice liability inevitably 
raises the cost of legal services for other, law-abiding clients, since those losses 
are typically spread by lawyer-defendants, through malpractice insurance or 
otherwise, as a cost of doing business. One way to guard against these claims 
and related costs is by asserting that recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own 
unlawful conduct. 
In deciding whether and to what extent an unlawful conduct defense should 
foreclose otherwise viable theories of compensation, courts must balance a 
number of important considerations. The path chosen by the courts must 
encourage lawful conduct and personal responsibility;'" prevent persons from 
profiting from wrongful conduct;,,4 create appropriate incentives for the exercise 
of care b)' professionals;22S protect clients and others from attorney 
wrongdoing;"· and embrace rules that are sufficiently clear and administratively 
222 Cf. Katarina P. Lewinbuk, Let's Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers for 
Aiding and Abetting a Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIz. ST. L.J. 135, 135 (2008) 
(discussing the "recent trend of suing lawyers using every possible legal theory"). 
223 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing the pelicy of encouraging personal 
respensibility). 
2"1t is impertant for courts to scrutinize carefully a defendant's claims that, if permitted to recover 
damages in a tort action, the plaintiff will profit from his or her own wrongdoing. One case where 
the coun exercised such scrutiny was Boruschewilz v. Kirts, 554 N.E.2d 1112 (III. App. Ct. 1990). 
In Boruschewitz, an outpatient of a mental health center shot and killed two persons. In holding 
that the claims by the outpatient and her husband against the center and a physician were not barred 
by the fact that the outpatient had been crintinally prosecuted and found guilty but insane, the coun 
wrote: 
While the statutes and cases cited to this coun are prentised upen the principle that a 
person should not benefit from his illegal act, we find this principle to be inapplicable 
in the case at bar. The plaintiffs in this case are not attempting to profit from an 
illegal act. Plaintiffs are seeking compensation for damages they allegedly suffered; 
they are not attempting to profit. If plaintiffs can prove the allegations set forth in their 
amended complaint, they will be made whole again; they will not receive ''profit.'' 
Id. at 1115. Of course, the mere absence of profit does not mean that there are no good reasons for 
finding a wrongful conduct defense applicable to • given set of facts. See Orzel by Orzel v. Scott 
Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 213 n.9 (Mich. 1995) (opining that the wrongful conduct rule is not 
restricted to cases in which the plaintiff bas profited from illegal conduct and that damages 
resulting from addiction were Dot recoverable from a pharmacy because the claim was based, at 
least in part, on the drug user's own illegal conduct). 
22S Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Standardized Tests, Erroneous Scores, and Tort Liability, 38 RUTGERS 
LJ. 655, 668-73 (2007) (discussing the role of litigation in creating incentives for good practices). 
22' Cf. LEGALMALPRAcnCE LAw, supra note 66, at 51 (noting that "[cllients are often ill-equipped 
to bargain with professionals for appropriate levels of protection"). 
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convenient that they can be applied fairly and can encourage the resolution of 
claims, either in the courts or via settlement negotiations or other alternative 
d· I· h· 227 Ispute reso utton mec amsms. 
The most desirable course is one that steers clear of extremes. Unlawful 
conduct by malpractice plaintiffs should not be overlooked, nor should it be too 
ready disqualifying from judicial recourse. The courthouse doors should be 
closed only if the plaintiff's unlawful conduct is so serious, so well established, 
and so closely connected to the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks 
compensation that the petition for relief should wholly be rejected because sound 
public policy demands it. 
Mindful of these considerations, future development of the unlawful 
conduct defense should be guided by the following principles: 
First, legislation creating an unlawful conduct defense should be treated as 
inapplicable to legal malpractice'28 lawsuits unless the legislation manifests a 
clear intent, by its text or legislative history, that the law is intended to govern 
issues of lawyer liability.22. This approach will ensure that statutes drafted for 
other purposes-typicaIly to govern relationships neither consensual nor fiduci~ 
in nature-do not undermine the fiduciary principles and related public policies 0 
that play an important role in most legal malpractice actions. 
Second, in addressing whether a plaintiff's unlawful conduct bars recovery 
in a legal malpractice action, courts should refrain from using nebulous or ilI-
structured concepts, such as the in pari delicto rule or unclean hands doctrine, 
and should instead employ a carefully articulated unlawful conduct defense, 
which clearly specifies its elements and places the burden of proof on the 
defendant. This will avoid misunderstandings as to what must be proved and 
who must prove it. Placing the burden on the defendant will also avoid 
premature foreclosure of redress in the courts by making clear that there is no 
presumption that judicial consideration of malpractice claims is barred. 
Third, only the most serious forms of unlawful conduct, knowingly 
committed by the plaintiff, should suffice as the predicate for an unlawful 
conduct defense in a legal malpractice action. The plaintiff's commission of 
227 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing the policy that tort rules should be 
"administratively convenient and efficient, and should avoid intractable inquiries"). 
228 The tenn "legal malpractice" is used here in its broad sense and includes suits against lawyers 
by both clients and nonclients. 
22. A similar approach has been taken in the field of lawyer confidentiality. Authorities argue that 
state reporting statutes imposing a duty on '"any person," but not expressly referring to lawyers, do 
not supersede the fiduciary obligations of lawyers to maintain confidentiality of client information. 
See generally NATIIAN CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE 
PROFESSION (3d ed. 2005). 
230 Suits by nonclients against lawyers typically do not allege breach of fiduciary duty, but are 
animated by other important public policies, including1 in some cases, a need to maintain the honor 
of the legal profession. Cf In re Conduct of Hiller, 694 P.2d 540, 544 (Or. 1985) (opining that" A 
person must be able to trust a lawyer's word as the lawyer should expect his word to be understood, 
without having to search for equivocation, hidden meanings, deliberate half-truths or camouflaged 
escape hatches. "). 
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fraud, peIjury, or another grievous felony would readily fall within this category. 
Many other forms of bad conduct, even if violative of a statute or in some sense 
immoral, wiIl fall short of this demanding standard. This is appropriate, for the 
law should be reluctant to label one an outlaw unfit to seek redress in the courts. 
Of course, the plaintiff's knowing commission of serious unlawful conduct must 
be convincingly proven, either by prior adjudication in a criminal or civil 
proceeding, or in the legal malpractice action itself. in the latter case, a 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof would seem to be appropriate 
because many affirmative defenses, including ones based on the plaintiff's 
conduct, such as comparative negligence or comparative fault, are adjudicated on 
that basis. 
Fourth, the plaintiff's knowing commission of serious unlawful conduct 
should be a total defense to liability only if that conduct is both a factual and 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, judged according to ordinary tort 
principles. To satisfy the demands of factual causation, the plaintiff's conduct 
must have been such a substantial factor that it made an indisrensable 
contribution to the production of the harm (i.e., was a but-for causei3 or was 
independently sufficient to cause that harm regardless of whether the lawyer 
acted improperly (i.e., must fall within the well-recognized multiple-causation 
exception to the but-for rule).232 Further, to meet the requirements of proximate 
causation, the harm for which the plaintiff seeks recovery must have been a 
foreseeable result or a direct consequence of the plaintiff's unlawful conduct.233 
Finally, in cases not meeting the demanding requirements of the unlawful 
conduct defense, outlined above-{\) serious unlawful conduct, (2) knowingly 
committed, that is a (3) factual and (4) proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm-
conduct of the plaintiff that is otherwise immoral or illegal should be treated as a 
defense only to the extent that it constitutes a form of contributory or 
comparative negligence or assumption of the risk. The effect of such a finding 
would then be determined by the rules of the jurisdiction governing contributory 
negligence, comparative negligence, or comparative fault. 
The legal system is ill-served by the recent rush to broadly impose 
innocence or exoneration requirements on plaintiffs alleging malpractice in 
criminal representation and by the continued judicial application of hazy and 
poorly structured concepts, such as the in pari delicto and unclean hands 
doctrines, in actions against attorneys. It is appropriate and necessary for courts 
to embrace a clearly articulated unlawful conduct defense in legal malpractice 
cases under terms that foreclose judicial redress only in a narrow range of cases 
where the plaintiff's unlawful conduct is serious, knowingly committed, and 
'" See generally REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (p.F.D. No. I 2005) (discussing the basic 
test for factual causation). 
232 See generally id at § 27 (discussing multiple sufficient causes). 
233 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 14, at 420·23 (discussing the direct causation and 
foreseeability approaches to proximate causation analysis). An alternative test is a requirement that 
the injurious result must have been one of the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious. See 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (2005) (discussing limitations on liability for tortious 
conduct). 
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closely tied by principles of factual and proximate causation to the injuries for 
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages. 
